Reasons for Financing R&D Using the SWORD Structure by Theodossiou, Alexandra Kleanthis
Reasons for Financing R&D Using the SWORD Structure
A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty
of
Drexel University
By
Alexandra Kleanthis Theodossiou
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree
of
Doctor of Philosophy
January 2007
ii
iii
Dedications
To my parents Kleanthi and Anna
For teaching me what no school or teacher can teach,
To my children Theophani, Aristoniki and Anna Maria
For making every moment special
To the one I never held
I am always thinking about you, you are not forgotten
iv
Acknowledgements
A number of individuals have contributed to this dissertation. I particularly thank my
thesis advisor, dr. Samuel S. Szewczyk for his continuous support and guidance. He
provided new directions and ideas and structure to the dissertation. I would have not
been able to finish without his expert advice and for that I am very grateful to him. I
also want to thank Dr. Zaher Zantout for keeping the standards high. I have learned
quite a lot from him through the development of the dissertation and his efforts are
greatly appreciated. I owe a debt of gratitude to Dr. Michael Gombola for pointing new
directions for my topic. Although they seemed impossible to execute, they made the
dissertation so much more interesting. I also want to thank Dr. Jacqueline Garner and
Dr. Nandini Chandar for their support. Finally I owe to acknowledge one more person,
Maria Myers, the finance department secretary. She has been very supportive
throughout the dissertation process and I thank her for that.
vTable of Contents
LIST OF TABLES.........................................................................................................vi
LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................... vii
ABSTRACT...................................................................................................................ix
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................1
CHAPTER 2. FINANCIAL ENGINEERING USING THE SWORD
CORPORATION AND R&D LP STRUCTURES................................10
2.1 The SWORD Corporation......................................................................10
2.2 The SWORD R&D LP Structure...........................................................15
CHAPTER 3. ACCOUNTING TREATMENT OF THE SWORD STRUCTURE......17
CHAPTER 4. HYPOTHESES......................................................................................20
4.1 The earnings management hypothesis ...................................................20
4.2 The “debt overhang” and “debt insurance” problems hypothesis .........22
4.3 Information asymmetries hypothesis .....................................................24
4.4 Separating assets of different risk classes hypothesis............................26
4.5 Sequential financing hypothesis ............................................................27
CHAPTER 5. . METHODOLOGY ...............................................................................31
5.1 Tests for earnings management .............................................................31
5.2 Tests for the “debt overhang” and “debt insurance” problems hypothesis
................................................................................................................36
5.3 Tests for the information asymmetries hypothesis ................................38
5.4 Tests for the separation of assets of different risk classes hypothesis ...39
5.5 Tests for the sequential financing hypothesis ........................................41
CHAPTER 6. SAMPLE DESCRIPTION......................................................................43
CHAPTER 7. EMPIRICAL RESULTS ........................................................................62
CHAPTER 8. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS .................................74
VITA
vi
List of Tables
1. Description of the sample research and development programs that were
financed through the SWORD structure ............................................................86
2. Chronological distribution and the method of issuance of the sample SWORD
securities ............................................................................................................95
3. Industry classification of the SWORD sample by the 1987 SIC code ..............96
4. Descriptive statistics of the research and development companies forming
SWORD entities.................................................................................................97
5.a The SWORD forming companies and their R&D intensity matching sample ..99
5.b Industry and R&D intensity adjusted descriptive statistics of the research and
development companies forming SWORD entities.........................................102
6.a Industry mean adjusted descriptive statistics of the research and development
companies forming SWORD entities...............................................................104
6.b Industry median adjusted descriptive statistics of the research and development
companies forming SWORD entities...............................................................105
7. Description of the sample research and development programs that were
financed through the offering/placement of common stock and warrants.....107
8. Chronological distribution and the method of issuance of the offering
or/placement of common stock and warrants sample to finance R&D programs
..........................................................................................................................109
9. Industry classification of the common stock and warrants offerings/placements
sample by the 1987 SIC code...........................................................................110
10. Description of the sample research and development programs which were
financed through the offering/placement of common stock ...........................111
11. Chronological distribution and the method of issuance of the offering
/placement of common stock sample to finance R&D programs ...................113
12. Industry classification of the common stock offerings/placements sample to
finance R&D programs by the 1987 SIC code ................................................114
vii
13. Descriptive statistics and comparisons of the gross proceeds raised through the
SWORD structure, stock and warrant or stock only offerings to finance R&D
..........................................................................................................................115
14.a Short-term event study for the SWORD formation announcements ...............117
14.b Short-term event study for the final decision announcements.........................119
15. Pre and post-announcement average abnormal buy and hold stock returns ....120
16. Pre and post SWORD formation announcement long term stock price
performance .....................................................................................................122
17.a The impact of a SWORD entity on the parent company’s consolidated income
statement during the years it pays revenues to the parent company................125
17.b Cumulative impact of the SWORD entities on the parent company’s
consolidated income statement during the years they pay revenues to the
parent company................................................................................................128
18.a Descriptive statistics and comparison of the information asymmetries proxies
between the SWORD companies and their matching samples ........................129
18.b Level of information asymmetries in the year prior to and in the year after the
announcement for the sample companies ........................................................131
19. Changes in post-event risk ...............................................................................133
20. Delisting codes, reasons and number of delisted companies for the SWORD
sample and its R&D matching sample for 5 years after the year of a SWORD
formation..........................................................................................................133
21. Delisting codes, reasons and number of delisted companies for the SWORD
sample and its R&D matching sample for 5 years after the year of a SWORD
formation..........................................................................................................135
viii
List of Figures
1. The corporation form of the SWORD financing arrangement ..........................84
2. The R&D LP form of the SWORD financing arrangement ..............................85
ix
Abstract
Reasons for Financing R&D Using the SWORD Structure
Alexandra K. Theodossiou
Samuel H. Szewczyk, Ph.D
Several companies in the science and technology-based industries used the SWORD
structure to finance some of their R&D programs. Yet, there is no clear rationale or
evidence that this structure is improves welfare. This study explores and/or develops 5
testable hypotheses pertaining to the reason(s) some firms use the SWORD structure.
The five hypotheses are (1) Earnings management hypothesis; (2) Debt
overhang/insurance hypothesis; (3) Separation of assets of different risk classes
hypothesis; (4) Information asymmetries hypothesis; and (5) Sequential investment
problem hypothesis. The final sample consists of 41 companies making 66 SWORD
announcements. Companies that form SWORD structures are young, high growth and
small capitalization companies that operate mainly in science and technology based
industries. They have the same leverage ratios as the average company in their
industry. They are financially healthy, and they form SWORD structures after periods
of strong stock performance. The strong impact SWORD structures have on the parent
company’s financial statements support the earnings management hypothesis. The
average leverage ratios of the sample companies fail to support the debt overhang/debt
insurance problems. Consistent with the implicit assumption of increased survivability
in the separation of different risk classes hypothesis we find that the formation of the
first SWORD structure increases the probability of survival for the parent company, in
the 5 years following the SWORD formation, by 23 percent. SWORD structures do not
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reduce information asymmetries for the parent company. The form of payment for the
acquisition and the moneyness of the warrants at the acquisition and expiration times
provide support for the sequential investment problem hypothesis. Overall the results
indicate that although SWORD structures can be used to make financial statements
look better, they can also provide solutions to the unique problems of R&D
investment. Based on the findings further regulation but not elimination of the
SWORD structures is recommended.

1
Chapter 1. Introduction
Special purpose enterprises (SPEs) are companies in the form of corporations,
limited partnerships or even trusts. They are formed with the sole purpose of carrying
out certain functions for one company (the parent company). Special purpose
enterprises have attracted a lot of negative attention from the press1 especially after the
Enron debacle. Despite their wide use in the corporate world, few understand their
functions. The stock and warrant offer for research and development (SWORD)
structures are special purpose enterprises designated to finance R&D projects for the
parent company. They have been used by companies that operate in science and
technology based industries. As part of the SPE family of companies they provide the
unique opportunity to study their structure and examine the interactions between the
SWORD and the SWORD forming company (the parent). I also examine the
motivations of the parent for forming SWORD entities and, more specifically, whether
SWORD structures are mainly used to make the financial statements of the parent
look better (‘window dressing’) and/or if they offer legitimate useful solutions to the
unique financing dilemmas faced by companies which operate in science and
technology based industries.
< insert figure1 about here>
The basic structure of a SWORD is the following. A company which needs to
raise capital in order to finance part of or its entire R&D program first forms a new
company which is essentially a shell company (with a CEO, a board of directors but
1 “Companies that abandon off-balance-sheet financing will also be giving up what’s widely regarded as
a “cosmetic” treatment that removes assets from the balance sheet to make ratios look better. “ CFO
Magazine, January 1, 2003.
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no employees). It transfers to this new company some proprietary assets and the right
to modify and develop these assets. In exchange the parent receives the option to
license any newly developed technology or product or even to acquire the SWORD
company through its right to call in the callable shares. In a typical SWORD structure
which is set up as a corporation, the SWORD company issues units, consisting of a
callable share of the SWORD corporation and typically a warrant to purchase usually a
parent’s share. If the SWORD is set up as limited partnership, investors purchase
interests in a research and development limited partnership (R&D LP) and warrants to
buy stock of the parent company. The SWORD company then contracts the parent
company to perform the R&D and makes periodic payments to it. If the outcome is
successful, then the parent company can exercise its option to purchase or license the
products developed through the joint research efforts. If the research program fails, the
parent company can simply terminate the project.
R&D is a unique class of investment. R&D investments are characterized by
extreme information asymmetries. Simply put, the managers of companies seeking
financing for their R&D projects have much better information ex ante about the
riskiness and the prospects of the R&D project than potential investors do. Leland and
Pyle (1977) and Myers and Maljuf (1984) were among the first to suggest that firms
might bypass positive NPV projects when there are information asymmetries that
cannot be mitigated. When companies seek external financing for their R&D projects,
they have to be careful about the information they reveal because of the fear of
imitation. They are therefore faced with the following dilemma: I) reduce the value of
their informational advantage and ii) raise financing at better terms that reflect the
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prospects of the innovation (Bhattacharya and Ritter, 1983). This problem can be
reduced by partial disclosure (Anton and Yao, 2002).
A moral hazard problem typically arises between parties or individuals in
situations where they share risks, and the private actions which are not observable to
the other party can affect the outcome (Holstrom, 1979). According to Holstrom these
actions cannot be observed and they therefore cannot be contracted. Holstrom further
points out that the moral hazard problem can be mitigated by investing additional
resources to monitor the actions of the parties or individuals and include that
information in the contracts between them. Since in any investment there are parties or
individuals sharing risks, and in addition R&D investment is characterized by extreme
information asymmetries, then it naturally follows that the costs of monitoring or
sharing risks in R&D investment will be high.
Another characteristic of R&D financing is the agency problem (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986) that exists between shareholders and management. In
addition to the traditional agency problems, where the management will not always
work to maximize shareholder wealth but to increase its own perquisites, in the case of
special purpose enterprises (SPEs) there are other types of agency problems which
exist between the investors of the SPEs and the management of the parent company.
Shevlin (1986) points out the following additional agency problems associated with
R&D LPs.
1. There is a conflict in how the payment and resource allocation between the
parent and the SPE is decided. This conflict arises because it is to the SPE
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investor’s benefit to keep these costs low, while the parent company has an
incentive to charge higher prices for its services.
2. The parent company can acquire knowledge for free through the research and
development of the contracted R&D, and this knowledge can be used in its
other projects.
3. It is difficult to estimate potential revenues that may result from any newly
developed product and how to allocate these revenues in a fair manner.
4. The parent company has an incentive to continue the development of the
growth opportunity even if it is not feasible to do so (overinvestment) so that
it can receive all the funds raised by the SWORD structure.
The high cost of financing R&D projects is further compounded by long
horizons and great uncertainty. R&D projects take years to complete and when they are
finished they are faced with lengthy regulatory approvals2.
R&D projects are multistage projects that give management the opportunity to
reevaluate them at different points in time, based on new information gathered up to
that point, and then decide whether to continue investing or quit the project. In addition
the uncertainty is greater at the early stages of the R&D project and diminishes as the
R&D project evolves. The two properties indicate that the valuation of R&D projects
should not be done according to the traditional net present value (NPV) rule but rather
using a real options framework (Hall, 2002).
2 According to DiMasi (2001) the average time in years from the pre-human testing phase to the FDA
decision for new chemical compounds (NCEs) increased from an average 8.1 years in the 1960s to 14.2
years in the 1990s. The rates of approval declined from 94.9% in the 1960s to 86.1% in the 1990s. For
recombinants, the rates of approvals in the 1990s were only 7% to 58% (Gosse et al., 1994). Grabowski
et al. (1990) find that only one in five drugs that were introduced from 1980 to 1984 generated revenues
that exceeded their R&D costs, and only the top 30 drugs were able to cover the average R&D industry
costs while the average return on R&D was about 9% of the average industry cost of capital.
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The SWORD structure is not a traditional financing mechanism. It is a product
of financial engineering, and as such it can be characterized as a financial innovation.
If it is, then according to Finnerty (2002), it should enable companies to accomplish
something more efficiently, for example raise capital at a lower cost or enable
companies to accomplish something that could not have been accomplished with the
existing market financing mechanisms.
SWORDs are used in their entirety by companies that operate in science and
technology based industries which invest heavily in R&D. This fact implies that the
SWORD structures address particular needs of the R&D investment that other
traditional financing mechanisms cannot.
The first SWORD structure appears in 1980, and the last formation
announcement is in 1998. There is no obvious explanation for the discontinuation of
the SWORD structure as a financing vehicle after 1998. Schiff (2004) claims that
companies stopped using special purpose entities to finance R&D after the bad
publicity SPEs received following the Enron debacle. In 1998 we also have some of
the toughest anti-fraud regulations established. The new regulations, along with the
bad publicity SPEs received, offer an explanation as to why there are no new SWORD
formations after 1998.
The SWORD structures have been praised (Schiff, 2004; Solt, 1993), but they
have also been affected by the negative attention that SPEs attracted after Enron.
Regulators are working hard and fast to regulate certain aspects of the SPEs which
have enabled the parent companies in the past to make their financial statements look
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better (‘window dressing’). Cetus, one of the sample companies which formed two
SWORD entities, states the following in its 2004 10-K.
In January 2003, the FASB issued FIN No. 46,"Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities."
Subsequently, in December 2003, the FASB issued a revised version of FIN 46 (FIN 46R). FIN 46 and
FIN 46R require a variable interest entity to be consolidated by a company if that company is subject to
a majority of the risk of loss from the variable interest entity's activities or entitled to receive a majority
of the entity's residual returns or both. FIN 46 and FIN 46R also require disclosures about variable
interest entities that a company is not required to consolidate but in which it has a significant variable
interest.
There is no readily available explanation in corporate finance why a company
will form a SWORD structure and transfer the rights of part of its R&D program to the
SWORD company, only to purchase it later. The parent company sometimes itself
contributes millions of dollars to the SWORD structure without expecting the
investors of that company to repay these amounts (Dura Corp). There are parent
companies that themselves assume loans, only to loan the proceeds to the SWORD
companies (Centocor for two of its partnerships). In addition, the parent companies
have very little debt in their structure, which appears to contradict the assessment of
regulators that SPEs are used to hide debt. They also continue to invest heavily in
R&D even after the formation of the SWORD structure. The low debt and the
continuously increasing investment in R&D, even after the formation of the SWORD
structure, do not appear to support the assessment that they are used to manage
earnings.
I find that companies which form SWORD structures are young, low
capitalization firms and high growth. They are bankruptcy remote, and they have
similar R&D intensity and leverage ratios to the average firm in their industry. They
outperform other companies with similar risk characteristics in the years prior to the
SWORD formation.
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This study makes a very important contribution. I believe it is the first study
that tries to follow and estimate directly the impact the SWORD structure has on the
financial statements of the parent so that I can answer the question of earnings
management. I find that the impact is large in year 0, the announcement year, and the
two years after year 0. The effect, although still positive, diminishes with time. This
finding supports the popular belief of earnings management.
While I also explore alternative explanations for the use of the SWORD
structures, I find that they help companies increase their survival odds when compared
to other companies of similar risk characteristics. In addition they are a solution to
financing R&D projects through sequential investments.
These findings have very important implications. They point to the fact that
although SWORDs can be used to ‘beautify’ financial statements, they also offer
solutions to the unique financing needs of R&D investments. Based on these findings I
find support for the decision of SEC and other regulatory agencies to regulate SPEs
even more rather than eliminate them completely.
I proceed in the following manner. In section 2 I describe the two forms of
SWORD structures, the corporation and the R&D LP. In section 3 I detail the financial
reporting of the parent company and the SWORD. In section 4 I draw from the existing
literatures in finance, economics and accounting to develop testable hypotheses
regarding the motives for using these structures. I employ past research to support my
hypotheses while also providing arguments and empirical results from past studies that
may or may not support them. In chapter 5, I develop the methodology to test the
hypotheses. In chapter 6 there is a detailed description of the sample. I then proceed in
8
chapter 7 to present the empirical results. In the final chapter, chapter 8, I provide
summary and concluding remarks.
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Chapter 2. Financial engineering using the SWORD Corporation and R&D
LP structures
2.1 The SWORD Corporation
The SWORD structure was first used by the computer industry, but it soon
gained popularity mostly among the biotech companies. The following is a description
of a SWORD arrangement.
A company with a research program decides to form a special purpose
enterprise (SPE) to finance part or its entire R&D program. It first forms a shell
company with no employees. The parent company assigns to the SWORD company
some proprietary assets and rights through the technology license agreements. Through
these agreements the SWORD company usually receives the rights of a ‘worldwide,
exclusive, royalty free license in perpetuity’ (Solt, 1993) to research and develop these
proprietary assets. There are cases, however, in which the SWORD company has to
pay license fees to the parent company and sometimes royalties, especially if these
licenses were or will be obtained through a third party. Neozyme, a SWORD company
formed by Genzyme in August of 1990, declared in its 10-K statement on December 1,
1992:
Pursuant to the Technology License Agreement, Genzyme has granted, and has been paid $2,450,000 by
Neozyme for an exclusive right and license to certain patent and technology rights owned or controlled
by Genzyme or acquired by Genzyme during the term of the Development Agreement.
Receptech, a SWORD company formed by Immunex in August of 1988, declared the
following in its 10-K document on 12/31/89.
Immunex and Receptech entered into a technology license agreement under which Immunex granted
Receptech an exclusive right and license in certain patent and other intellectual property rights owned by
Immunex and relating to IL-1 receptor, IL-4 receptor, IL-7 receptor, TNF receptor and IL-8 receptor.
The scope of the license is limited to development of human therapeutic products (the “Field") in the
United States and Canada (the "Territory"). The license is royalty-free, except that Receptech must pay
Immunex royalties on sales of IL-1 receptor and IL-4 receptor which are equal to the royalties Immunex
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must pay in respect of sales of such products under an agreement by which Immunex acquired
worldwide rights in these products.
Although the SWORD companies may obtain the licenses to develop, manufacture and
market certain technologies or products of the parent company, the parent company
can decide not to allow the SWORD company to develop a particular technology or
product through its rejection rights for a pre-specified payment that takes the form of
shares of the parent company or cash. Elan, described its rejection rights concerning
DRC in its 20-F A01form filed on January 7, 1993.
Pursuant to the Agreements, DRC has the right to obtain a license to manufacture, sell and otherwise
market certain designated products utilizing the technologies developed by Elan. In certain
circumstances, Elan may reject the exercise by DRC of its option to any of the products (with the
exception of Orphan Drugs (as defined in the Agreements), where no payment will be made). Elan has
agreed to pay to DRC an amount of US$15,000,000 (payable in cash or Ordinary Shares or ADS at
Elan's option) if Elan exercises its rejection right for any of the designated products.
The new company has a CEO that is appointed by the parent company and a
board of directors. There are no other employees. Certain directors of the SWORD
company can also be employees of the parent company, and as such they are
compensated only by the parent company. Bio-Electro, in its proxy statement, dated
6/1/90 declared
The only officer of BES compensated by BES is Allen Phipps. For 1989, Mr. Phipps received a fee of
$50,000 for serving as president and chief operating officer of BES. No other officer of BES receives
any remuneration from BES, but all such officers other than Mr. Phipps are employees of ALZA
Corporation ("ALZA") and as such receive salaries from ALZA for services performed for ALZA.
Through the services agreement the parent agrees to provide management and
administrative services to the new company and the two companies agree on the
compensation for these services.
The SWORD company makes initial public offering units (IPO units) that
usually consist of one callable share of the SWORD company and a warrant to
purchase one share of the parent company’s common stock or private unit offerings.
11
The callable shares give the right to the parent company to acquire any newly
developed technology or products by exercising its option to call the shares of the
SWORD structure for a predetermined price. The warrants are an alternative
mechanism for the investors of the SWORD to participate in any upward movement of
the parent’s stock and extend their profits beyond the ceiling that the puttable stock of
the SWORD company imposes. The SWORD company’s callable shares can be called
by the parent at a strike price that escalates over time up to a certain maturity date,
usually within two to six years after the offering. In the early years of the SWORD
appearance, the units (the SWORD company’s callable shares and the warrants) stayed
together. When Centocor formed Tocor II in late 1991, the company offered in
addition to the first type of warrants, a second type that could separate from the units
after a certain period. Centocor described the new type of offering offering in its
CENTOCOR INC, 8-K, Exhibit 99. Additional Exhibits, filed on January 11, 1994:
The Tocor II Units offered a new wrinkle compared to typical SWORDS, which was a second set of
warrants for the sponsoring company's (Centocor) stock. This second set of warrants represents an
additional sweetener (compared to typical SWORDS) in case the research efforts did not amount to
anything and the affiliate is not bought out. The first set of warrants stays with the stock, but the second
set trades separately after a certain date. These warrants expire if the sponsoring company (Centocor)
buys the affiliate.
After Centocor and Tocor II, the companies use a second type of warrants as parts of
the units. This second generation of warrants typically starts trading separately within
three to six months after the offering. If there were more than one series of warrants,
the additional series was also callable by the parent company.
In addition to the units, the SWORD company also issues a series of special
shares that are purchased by the parent company and to which parent company these
special shares confer certain limited rights. It is through these shares that the parent
company effectively controls the actions of the SWORD corporation. Advanced
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Therapeutic Systems, a SWORD company formed by ELan PLC, in their 20-F form,
filed on February 6, 1995, described the limited rights that special shares confer to the
parent company.
Elan currently owns all of the issued and outstanding Special Shares, par value $1.00 per share, of the
Company (the "Special Shares"). The Special Shares confer upon Elan certain limited rights, including
the right to appoint one director to the Board of Directors of the Company and the right to purchase all,
but not less than all, of the outstanding Common Shares of the Company. Although the Special Shares
do not entitle Elan to vote at any meeting of the shareholders of the Company and do not confer upon
Elan the right to receive any dividend or other distribution, or any right or interest in the profits or assets
of the Company, any resolution to wind up the affairs of or liquidate the Company will confer upon Elan
a right to vote and the Special Shares will carry the number of votes equal to the total number of votes
carried by the Common Shares outstanding at the time. Purchase Option. Elan, as the holder of all of the
issued and outstanding Special Shares of the Company, has the right to purchase all, but not less than all,
of the Company's Common Shares outstanding at the time such right is exercised (the "Purchase
Option"). Until the expiration of the Purchase Option, no resolution or act of the Company to authorize
or permit any of the following will be effective without the prior written approval of Elan, or any
subsequent holder or holders of a majority of the outstanding Special Shares: (i) the allotment or issue of
shares or other securities of the Company or the creation of any right to such allotment or issue; (ii) the
reduction of the Company's authorized share capital; (iii) borrowings by the Company over an aggregate
of $1,000,000 outstanding at any one time; (iv) the sale or other disposition of, or the creation of any
lien on, the whole or a material part of the Company's undertaking or assets except in the ordinary
course of its business; (v) the declaration or payment of dividends or the making of any other
distributions to shareholders of the Company; (vi) the amalgamation of the Company; and (vii) any
alteration of the Purchase Option.
The parent and the SWORD company enter into the research and/or
development agreements whereby the parent agrees to continue the research and
development of the technologies that are now the assets of the SWORD company, on
behalf of the SWORD company. For its efforts the parent organization is compensated,
usually with an upfront lump sum and then according to a staged financing scheme that
depends on the parent company achieving certain milestones in the research program.
In addition the parent company becomes responsible for the filing of patent approval
for promising technologies.
If the research and development program is successful, then the parent has the
option to purchase the technology license on a product-by-product basis or to call in
the SWORD shares or even the units (both shares and warrants). The typical method is
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through exchange offers. The method of payment can be in cash, shares of the parent
company, new warrants or any combination of the three. In addition the parent
company may offer contingent value rights (CVRs) that entitle their holders, without
any additional cost, to acquire a number of the parent company’s shares if certain
conditions are met. Gensia described such an offering to the shareholders of Aramed,
on its 10-K A01, filed on April 30, 1996.
The consideration paid for each Aramed share was (a) $8.00 in cash, (b) approximately 0.64 of a share
of Common Stock of the Company, and (c) one contingent value right (CVR) that represents (i) the right
to receive $1.00 per Aramed share payable in cash or in the Common Stock of the Company (at the
Company's option) at March 31, 1996, and (ii) a right maturing at December 31, 1996 to potentially
receive for each Aramed share up to an additional 0.75 of a share of Common Stock of the Company. If
the price of the Common Stock of the Company equals or exceeds $4.50 per share for 20 consecutive
trading days between issuance and maturity, then the rights maturing on December 31, 1996, will be
reduced to represent for each share of Aramed a right potentially to receive 0.375 of a share of Common
Stock of the Company.
The parent company reports the transaction either as a merger or an acquisition. If the
program is unsuccessful then the parent can simply abandon the R&D project without
having to pay anything to the investors of the SWORD. This option is clearly stated on
the SEC filings of the parent companies. In the 10-K form filed by Bio Electro Systems
Inc (BES), which was formed by ALZA on April 6, 1989, there is the following
paragraph.
ALZA is under no obligation to exercise the Purchase Option, and will do so only if such exercise is in
the best interest of ALZA (I am not clear if the following sentence is also part of the quote. If it is, then
this is okay as it is and you should ignore this cross out.. If the following sentence is not part of the
quote,then you need to make the quote part of the text because only quotes over 40 words are set off as
separate.
The agreements may be terminated by each party upon certain defaults, certain
changes in control, the mutual determination by the parties or at such time as the
SWORD company has exhausted its available funds.
Although it seems all agreements are designed to favor the parent company, the
investors of the SWORD company always have a recourse that is independent of the
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outcome of the R&D, the warrants. If the R&D project fails, then the SWORD
investors can always share in the parent company’s future prospects by exercising their
warrants and acquiring an equity position in the parent company if it is profitable to do
so. Figure 1 represents the interactions between the parent company, the SWORD
company and the investor.
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2.2 The SWORD R&D LP structure
< Insert figure 2 about here >
Another type of SWORD structure, the R&D LP3 is a special purpose
enterprise (SPE) formed for the sole purpose of funding an R&D project through R&D
limited partnerships which appear earlier (in the mid 1970s) than the SWORD
structures.
An R&D company forms an R&D limited partnership with investors. The R&D
company transfers to the limited partnership some proprietary assets and assigns the
rights to modify and use these proprietary assets to the partners. In exchange, the
parent company assigns a general partner that is a wholly owned subsidiary of the
R&D company (itself an SPE), created with the sole purpose to manage the
partnership’s businesses, assume legal debts and obligations, and provide management
services to the partnership. Through the general partner the parent company can also
contribute to the research program.
The limited partners provide the parent or an affiliate of the parent the funds for
the contract R&D project. They pay to the general partner management fees. The
general partner usually has a 1 percent stake in the SWORD structure. Each partner’s
liability is limited to his/her investment, provided they don’t engage actively in the
management of the partnership. In exchange for their investment the partners receive
interests in the limited partnership and warrants to purchase shares of the research and
development company. If the R&D project is successful, then the limited partnership
owns the rights to it and can either
3 Shevlin,(1986)describes the R&D LP and the tax treatment concerning the partnership and the parent
organization extensively.
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1. License the product or technology to the parent and receive royalties (royalty
partnership),
2. Sell the technology or product to the parent organization for a lump sum and/or
stock in the parent company,
3. Form a new joint venture with the parent to further develop and market the
product (joint partnership), or form an equity partnership with the parent to
develop and market the product. In an equity partnership, the parent and the
partners merge into a new corporation.
A different form of R& D limited partnership is the R&D LP fund. First an
independent agent forms an R&D LP. Then the independent agent gathers funds from
investors and through various limited partnerships finances different R&D projects
contacted by many R&D companies. I drop from my sample all R&D funds since they
are not similar to the SWORD structure. Figure 2 is a graphical representation of an
R&D LP.
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Chapter 3. Accounting treatment of the SWORD structures
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) recognizing the complex
relationship of research and development arrangements, in October 1982, issued the
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 68 (FAS68). Since 1982 the
statement had only minor modifications.
FAS68 guides a company on the accounting treatment of the funding of its
R&D program by others. The company which receives funding for its R&D through
such arrangements should first determine and prove whether it is obligated to perform
only contractual R&D for others or if through such arrangements, the company is in
essence borrowing funds and therefore it is obligated to repay them.
The tests which will determine how the R&D arrangement should be classified,
first determine whether all financial risk of the R&D project has been transferred to the
SWORD company. If in any way the company which receives the funding, is obligated
to repay any amount to the SWORD company and the repayment does not depend on
the outcome of the R&D project, then there is an obligation to repay. The same rule
also applies if there are agreements to purchase the units, stock or interests of the
SWORD company or to pay upon completion or termination of the arrangement with
debt or equity securities and this agreement is independent of the outcome of the R&D
project. In all the above cases financial risk has not been completely transferred and
therefore the arrangement represents an obligation to repay.
According to FAS68, ‘Concepts Statement 3 uses the term obligation to include
duties imposed legally or socially’. Therefore although it may not be written explicitly
in the agreement between the SWORD and the parent company that the parent
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company is obligated to pay any funds i.e the arrangement does not represent a legal
liability for the parent company, it is possible that the parent company will have to
recognize such an arrangement as a liability for financial reporting purposes. This is
true if the ‘surrounding conditions might indicate that the enterprise is likely to bear
the risk of failure of the research and development’4. If it is likely that independently of
the R&D outcome, the parent company will pay part or all of the funds raised by the
SWORD company, then the arrangement between the parent company and the
SWORD represents an obligation (liability) to the parent company and is treated as a
liability for financial reporting purposes. Examples of “surrounding conditions” which
will lead to the presumption that there is an obligation to repay are, the expression of
intent by the parent company to repay part or all of the funds, severe economic penalty
if the parent does not repay any of the funds or if the outcome of the R&D project is
known with certainty.
If it is determined that the arrangement represents an obligation to repay the
SWORD company then the parent company is obligated to expense the R&D costs as
they happen, and to record a liability.
If it is determined that the arrangement results in the complete transfer of the
financial risk from the parent company to the SWORD company then the parent
company will ‘account for its obligation as a contract to perform research and
development for others’5.
4 Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 68, page 5
5 Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 68, page 6
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For the warrants issued as part of the units of the SWORD company, a portion
of the proceeds will be accounted as paid-in capital. This portion represents the fair
value of the warrants at the time of the arrangement.
The tax treatment of research and development expenditures is provided by the
Internal Revenue Code Section 174 (IRC §174). The code allows for two methods of
treating R&D expenditures. The two methods are i) the expense method, and ii) the
capitalization and amortization method. Both methods are “methods of accounting”
which means that in their first year they can choose one or the other method without
the consent of the IRS. Once however a choice is made, and in the following years, the
company has to follow the chosen method unless it obtains permission from the IRS to
change its method of accounting.
If the expensing method is chosen then R&D expenditures are expensed in the
year they occur. If the capitalization/amortization method is selected, the company
starts amortizing its R&D expenses for no less than 60 months from the time the
product(s) of the R&D bring economic benefit to the company.
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Chapter 4. Research hypotheses
4.1 The earnings management hypothesis
In my search for possible motives I first focus on the off-balance-sheet
financing benefit derived when companies use the SWORD and R&D LP structures.
Off-balance sheet financing simply means that the parent organization can move debt
off its balance sheet and “hide” it in the balance sheet of its SWORD structure. An
additional benefit of off-balance sheet financing is the ability of the parent organization
to raise millions of dollars for its R&D program and through these structures to defer
the expensing of R&D expenditures (Healy et al., 1998). Both benefits suggest that one
of the reasons for using these structures is be earnings management or “window
dressing” as is otherwise known. According to Healy and Wahlen (1998),
Earnings management occurs when management uses judgment in financial reporting and in structuring
transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic
performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting
numbers.
Earnings management as a tool for increasing the firm’s value has been
successful in several cases. Barth, Elliot and Finn (1997) find that firms with consistent
patterns of earnings increases have higher price to earnings ratios and when this pattern
is interrupted then this premium decreases greatly. Teoh et al. (1998b) find that issuers
of seasoned equity who manage aggressively discretionary accruals report higher
income at the year of the offering. They find that this higher net income is caused by
managing discretionary accruals and not by increases in operating cash flows. As a
result, investors become overly optimistic about the prospects of these firms and
overvalue the seasoned equity offerings at the time of the offering. This trend is
reversed when the companies cannot maintain the high levels of income, and in the
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post issuance period we observe lower abnormal returns. Rangan (1998) also shows
that issuers of seasoned equity offerings manage earnings upwards in the quarter
preceding the offering and for two periods thereafter. Teoh et al. (1998a) find that IPO
issuers in the most “aggressive” quartile of earnings management have a three year
post-issuance stock return that is 20 percent below IPO issuers in the most
“conservative” quartile of earnings management. Teoh et al., (1998a) maintain that
earnings management may help partially explain the lower aftermarket abnormal
returns of IPO issuers. Sloan (1996) finds that stock prices act as if investors “fixate”
on earnings and therefore fail to distinguish between the accruals and cash flow
components of earnings. On the other hand, however, Lim, Mann and Mihov (2004)
argue that moving debt off-balance does not fool the market.
Shevlin (1991) finds that investors of companies which use R&D LP’s include
in their evaluation the LP as an option. Using a sub-sample of the companies used in
his previous paper (1987) the author shows that investors consider the LP as a call
option that gives rise to both the liabilities and the assets of the firm. Shevlin then uses
the methodology developed by Margrabe6 (1978) to evaluate the value of this call
option. Empirical results indicate that, market participants, view the call option of the
LP as relevant information for valuating the market value of the R&D company’s
equity and that the information for evaluating the LP is in the footnotes of the financial
statements of the R&D company.
If markets are efficient and the motive for the SWORD formation is earnings
management then I should observe at least one of the following: i) strong negative
6 Margrabe (1978) developed an option valuation method where one risky asset is exchanged for
another.
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market reaction at the announcement time of the SWORD formation, ii) better long
term benchmarked performance and iii) large impact on earnings per share.
4.2 The “debt overhang” and “debt insurance” problems hypothesis
A possible explanation for the use of the SWORD structure may be that it can
be a solution to the debt overhang and debt insurance problems (Jensen and Meckling,
1976; Myers, 1977). These problems simply exist “when the existing debt in place
deters new investment because the benefits from the new investment will go to insure
the existing debt by increasing its value in case of default rather than to the new
investors” (Lamont, 1995). This implies that there is a minimum return required by
potential investors of companies that face the debt overhang and debt insurance
problems, which is higher than the minimum return required for companies that don’t
have these problems. ‘Below that return the company cannot attract any new
investment, and therefore it cannot invest. The simple rule thus becomes investment is
only possible if the NPV of investing is greater than the debt overhang’7 (Lamont). If
this threshold required rate of return is high then the managers of the parent
organization may decide to bypass investment in some growth opportunities. Implicit
in this assumption is that the SWORD structure can solve this problem since it
separates the SWORD entity and establishes a new legal entity. This separation
7 Lamont, 1995, p. 1106. On the same page the author gives a simple example that describes the debt
overhang problem. Assume that we live in a simple economy where interest rates are zero and we have a
firm that has debt of $100 and income of $80. It has a new project that needs financing. The project will
cost $5 a day and it will pay $15 at the end of the year. The NPV of this project, therefore, is $10. If the
creditors are the first to be paid rational investors will not finance this project since the $10 will go to
pay the creditors. If, however, at the end of the year the project pays $30 in one year, then investors will
finance this project since they will invest $5 today and they will receive $10 one year from now.
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prevents wealth transfers from the investors of the SWORD entity to the bondholders
of the parent company.
The empirical evidence on the effect the debt overhang and debt insurance
problems have on investment is mixed. Debt overhang does not deter investment at all
times. Lamont(1995) believes that the debt overhang’ creates problems only in periods
when the economy is stagnant and returns to investment are low. In periods of
economic growth the returns are high enough so that the debt overhang and debt
insurance problems do not impede any new investment. Moyen (2000) maintains that
the underinvestment hurts shareholders only a little and this effect is more profound
when the economic times are bad and the marginal productivity of capital is low.
Hennessy (2004), however, finds that debt overhang distorts both the level and the
composition of investment, with underinvestment being more severe for long-lived
assets. This bias against long-lived assets is mitigated the greater the collateral value of
the asset. The author finds that the debt overhang is only partially mitigated by the
company’s ability to issue additional secured debt.
Since the evidence of the effect of the debt overhang and debt insurance
problems on investment is mixed, I hypothesize the SWORD and R&D LP structures
can be an efficient solution to suboptimal levels of investment caused by the presence
of the debt overhang and debt insurance problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers,
1977) because they separate the growth opportunity from the assets in place. This
separation prevents transfers of wealth from the shareholders to the creditors of the
parent organization since the parent organization raises capital through a new
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organization and the owners of the new organization (shareholders or partners) assume
most of the risk.
If the investors of the new company are rational, then it follows that they will
require a very high rate of return which will be in excess of the appropriate rate of
return, otherwise known as the “lemon premium”(Akelorf, 1970), as compensation for
the above risk factors. This would imply a trade-off for the parent organization
between higher costs of capital for growth opportunities that are successful and very
limited losses when the new growth opportunities fail.
There are serious concerns, however, about the use of the SWORD structures
as effective solutions to the debt overhang and debt insurance problems. If the payment
at the time of acquisition of the units, shares or interests is not cash, then I am back to
the same problem as in the beginning. Even if the means of payment is cash, the
creditworthiness of the parent is the most important factor that determines the parent’s
ability to buy back the SWORD units, shares or interests.
If the debt overhang and debt insurance hypothesis offer an explanation for the
SWORD formation, then the parent companies should have exhibit higher leverage
ratios when compared to their industries or other companies with similar
characteristics.
4.3 Information asymmetries hypothesis
The information asymmetries hypothesis starts with Myers’ (1977) view that
the value of a firm is a combination of its assets in place and its growth opportunities.
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This view suggests that the value of the firm can increase if either or both the value of
the assets in place or growth opportunities increases.
The sample consists of firms that are high growth firms, and I am mostly
concerned with the valuation of growth opportunities rather than assets in place since
the SWORD structure separates a subset of growth opportunities from the rest of the
growth opportunities for the firm. Following the thinking of Krishnaswami and
Subramanian (1999) I assume that managers of these firms have greater information
about the growth opportunities of their firms than investors. This information
asymmetry is further exacerbated by the fact that market participants observe the
aggregate value of the growth opportunities rather than their individual values, and this
may result in misevaluation of the company. Companies that create spin-offs
experience higher information asymmetries (Krishnaswami and Subramanian, 1999)
which are reduced after the completion of the spin-off when compared to a matching
sample, and the sample companies experience greater financing activity than their
matched sample after the completion of the spin off.
It is hard for high growth companies to reduce information asymmetries by
revealing more information since the growth opportunity is about the development of
knowledge, and others can learn for free (appropriability of knowledge). If I assume
that the parent companies face higher information asymmetries than other companies
of the same size, R&D intensity and in the same industry, then I hypothesize that by
separating a subset of growth opportunities from the set of growth opportunities, the
parent companies are able to reduce information asymmetries since it is easier to
evaluate a subset of growth opportunities when it stands alone than the whole set of
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growth opportunities. The reduction of information asymmetries makes the overall
value of the company more transparent and therefore it can enhance it. If the
information asymmetries hypothesis is true, then I should observe the following: i) the
SWORD forming companies should exhibit higher information asymmetries than other
companies with similar characteristics, and ii) the level of information asymmetries
should be lower in the year following the announcement year when compared to the
information asymmetry levels in the year prior to the announcement year.
4.4 Separating assets of different risk classes hypothesis
The separation of assets of different risk classes’ hypothesis has the same origin
as the information asymmetries hypothesis. It starts with Myer’s (1977) view that a
firm is the combination of its assets in place and its growth opportunities. In addition,
Myers views these as assets that differ more in degree than in kind because even assets
in place have an option part in their value since they need future discretionary
investment, such as maintenance.
The systematic risk of a firm (its beta) is simply the sum of the weighted betas
of the assets in place and growth opportunities. There is some evidence that the betas
of growth opportunities are higher than the betas for the assets in place for the same
firm (Jacquier, Titman and Atakan, 2001; Chung and Charoenwong, 1991; Skinner
1993). This means that the overall beta of the firm will decrease if the relative weight
of the growth opportunities decreases while the beta of the growth opportunities either
remains the same or decreases.
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The sample consists of young biotech firms mostly, whose values depend on
their growth opportunities. The fate of a biotech sometimes may simply depend on the
development of one single drug8. This means that it is harder for the SWORD forming
companies to bear their own risk than investors since investors can hold a well
diversified portfolio in many other different risk class assets. The companies can
reduce their own risk by separating a subset of growth opportunities with high betas
and establishing them as separate companies, while maintaining the option to acquire
these companies in case the research and development project turns out to be
successful. If, in addition, the overall value of the separated firm increases because of
a reduction in information asymmetries then the companies are able to increase their
market value while reducing their systematic risk.
If my hypothesis is true, then I should observe a decline in the beta of the
parent company in the years following the formation of the SWORD structure. Implicit
in this hypothesis is the assumption that the formation of SWORD structures will
increase their survivability odds; therefore I should also observe higher survival rates
for the companies which formed SWORD structures than companies with similar R&D
investment characteristics.
4.5 Sequential financing hypothesis
The last explanation is based on the multistage characteristic of R&D and the
real options approach to the valuation of R&D projects. The two characteristics
combined imply that a company does not need the full amount required for R&D
8 Wall Street Journal, April 27, 2005, How Eli Lilly’s Monster Deal Faced Extinction – but Survived, by
Leila Abboud, A1.
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upfront but rather in stages. In addition the warrants allow the company to raise
additional funds only when it needs them (Schultz, 1993).
Extending Mayer’s (1998) hypothesis, I start by considering a firm at the
beginning of a two period world. The firm has an investment project that starts
immediately, and its outcome is a random drawing at the end of the first period and an
investment option whose undertaking depends on the success of the investment project,
which option matures at the beginning of the second period and whose outcome is also
unknown. In addition there are several sub periods within the first period. The
company needs to finance the investment project and option and has to take into
account the two major factors, issuance costs and overinvestment. Smith (1977)
maintains that the costs of issuing small offerings can be as high as 15% of the
proceeds. The issuance costs are an important factor because they contain two
components, the fixed cost component associated with the frequency of issuance and a
variable cost component associated with the size (number of shares). The fixed cost
component indicates that a one -time issuance is better than several smaller ones if they
both raise the same capital. The variable cost component indicates that companies are
indifferent between a one time issuance and several smaller ones. If one considers that
the cost of issuing new shares is the sum of both the fixed and variable costs and they
are both positive, it is obvious that a one- time issuance is better that several smaller
ones. The one–time issuance may be a better choice in terms of costs, but it may also
exacerbate the overinvestment problem and multitasking9 problems. The
9 Multitasking is the ability of the managers of the parent company to transfer funds between different
R&D projects and use these funds for different R&D projects rather than the ones they were supposed to
finance.
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overinvestment problem exists because managers have an incentive to grow the
company beyond its optimal size since they get perquisites which are tied to firm size.
I now assume that the company can raise capital through either the additional
issuance of its own stock or the stock of a new company, the SWORD structure. If the
company raises capital through its own stock it has the option to either issue enough
new shares to raise capital for both the investment project and the option so that it
minimizes the issuance costs but increases the overinvestment problem (Jensen, 1986)
or issue enough stock to cover its financial needs for the first period and if the project
is successful at the end of the first period issue additional stock to cover its needs for
the second period. The second option results in higher issuance costs but minimizes the
overinvestment problem.
Next I consider the case where the company raises capital through the SWORD
structure. Since the SWORD structure creates a separate company, it follows that the
issuance of its stock will not have any negative effect on the parent’s stock, but it may
have a positive effect if it is perceived by the market participants that the parent
company is pursuing a growth opportunity at minimum risk. The company then can
raise enough capital for the investment project and additional capital through the
warrants as it grows. Since the parent company’s management has better information
about the prospects of the growth opportunity, it follows that it will include in the
exercise price of the warrants the possibility that the investment project will be
successful and the investment option will be undertaken.
Through the first period in my timeline the parent company receives periodic
payments, enough to cover its research and administrative expenses, thus avoiding the
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overinvestment problem. If the investment project is unsuccessful, the parent company
simply terminates the investment option. If this is the outcome then through the
SWORD structure the parent company avoids selling its own equity at the beginning of
period 1 when information asymmetries are extreme, or even not pursuing the project
altogether,10 and it is able to use the proceeds from the issuance of the SWORD
company’s stock and any interest accumulated to them to pursue the growth
opportunity. If the investment project is successful, then the parent company, always at
its discretion (it is clearly stated in the prospectuses), can choose the method of paying
for the callable stocks or units of the SWORD company, which can be in cash, shares
of the parent company, additional warrants or any combination of the three. This
option gives the parent company the opportunity to avoid a liquidity drain at the end of
period 1 if doing so will financially hurt the company and to issue additional shares of
its own stock which at the end of period one will factor the success of the investment
project and the possibility of success for the investment option.
If the sequential hypothesis is an explanation for the SWORD structures, then a
form of payment at the time of the acquisition should be new shares and warrants.
Additionally the warrants should be “in the money” either at the time the research and
development company exercises its option to acquire the SWORD or around the last
exercise call date of the warrants, or even at both times.
10 Leland and Pyle (1977), Myers and Maljuf, (1984).
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Chapter 5 Methodology
5.1 Tests for the earnings management hypothesis
If a company uses the SWORD structure to engage in earnings management to
increase its value, the market is efficient and investors are rational, I should not
observe any positive reaction to the announcement of the formation of the SWORD
structure, or I might even see a negative reaction. To measure the reaction of the
market participants to the announcements, I use the standard event methodology for
the period surrounding the announcement. My estimation period is 170 days, and it
ends 31 days prior to the announcement; my analysis period is 30 days before the
announcement to 30 days after the announcement. My event window is 0 days to +1
days relative to the announcement. Abnormal returns are computed as the error tem ,i t
in the market model
, , ,i t i i m t i tR a R   
where ,i tR and ,m tR are the continuously compounded returns of stock i and the
equally-weighted CRSP index on day t and ,i ia  are ordinary least squares estimators.
The null hypothesis tested is that the cumulative abnormal returns between periods 1
and 2 is equal to 0
1 2
( 0)T TCAAR  . The same event study is conducted for 3 additional
samples. The first sample consists of announcements of prior stock issuance by the
companies that later formed a SWORD structure (no later than 2 years). The second
sample consists of companies which announced they were issuing/placing stock and
warrants to finance R&D. The third sample consists of companies which announced
they were issuing/placing stock to finance only or mainly R&D.
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In addition to the short term event study, long term studies are conducted to
measure the performance of the SWORD forming companies prior to and after the
SWORD formation announcement. There are two methodologies employed, the buy
and hold methodology and the Fama, French (1993) portfolio methodology. The
examination periods extend from 3 years prior to the SWORD formation
announcement to 3 years after it. Both pre and post holding period studies are used so
that we can detect any trends in the stock performance of the sample companies. Since
in the sample there are multiple announcements by the same companies, we exclude all
consecutive announcements made by the same company with less than 3 years between
them. The final sample consists of 34 SWORD formation announcements.
In the buy and hold methodology the abnormal return for each event firm is
calculated as:
, , , ,( 1) - ( 1)
b b
i a b i t m t
t a t a
ER R R
 
   
where ER(we,a,b) = excess return for firm we over the time period from day a to day b,
itR = the return on the common share of event firm we on day t, and Rmt is either the
return on a reference portfolio (the CRSP equally-weighted index and the CRSP value
weighted index) or a matched firm on day t. The pre and post announcement abnormal
returns do not include the abnormal returns over days 0 through 1 relative to the Wall
Street Journal announcement date. If an event firm is de-listed before the end of a buy-
and-hold period, its truncated return series is still included in the analysis, and it is
assumed to earn the daily return of the benchmark for the remainder of the period. The
null hypothesis tested is that the mean and the median average monthly abnormal
return is equal to zero. First the performance of the companies is measured against
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both the equally and value weighted indexes. To avoid the positive bias resulting from
the comparison of company performance vs. a benchmark index, one to one matching
samples are constructed. Matched firms are selected using the following matching
criteria: (1) 3-digit SIC code R&D to sales in year -1, (2) 3-digit SIC code R&D to
market value in year -1 R&D (3) 4-digit SIC code, return on assets (ROA) and market
value (size) in year 0, the year of the announcement; (4) 3-digit industry SIC code and
size at the end of the previous month relative to the announcement calendar month; and
(5) size and the ratio of book to market value at the end of the previous month relative
to the announcement calendar month and (6) book-to-market ratio.
Since the buy and hold studies overstate abnormal returns because of the
compounding effect and this effect is more pronounced when the larger returns occur
early in the period, I also employ the Fama French (1993) portfolio methodology. The
pre and post-formation-announcement long-term abnormal stock returns of the sample
firms are estimated using rolling regressions of the Fama and French (1993) and
Carhart (1997) four-factor return model. To estimate the pre announcement one-, two,
and three-year period abnormal monthly returns, each month sample firms that formed
a SWORD structure in the next 12, 24 or 36 months are identified and then a value-
weighted average monthly return is calculated for the portfolio. The value-weighted
returns are based on the market values of the firms at the end of the month before the
announcement for both the pre and post announcement periods. To estimate the post
announcement one, two, and three-year period abnormal monthly returns, each month,
sample firms that formed a SWORD structure in the previous 12, 24 or 36 months are
identified and then a value-weighted average monthly return is calculated for the
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portfolio in that month. The monthly event portfolio returns Rp,t are used in the
following model of Fama and French and Carhart :
p ,t f ,t i m m,t f ,t s t h t M tR R ( R R ) SMB HML MOM          
where Rf,t is the one-month U.S. Treasury bill rate in month t, Rm,t is the return on the
value-weighted CRSP index in month t, SMBt is the difference between the returns on
portfolios of small and big stocks with about the same weighted average book-to-
market value of equity ratio in month t, HMLt is the difference between the returns on
portfolios of high and low book-to-market value of equity ratio with about the same
weighted average size in month t, MOM is the average return on the two high prior
return portfolios minus the average return on the two low prior return portfolios and  ,
m , s , h and M, are either ordinary- or weighted-least-squares estimates (OLS or
WLS). The WLS model weights each calendar month portfolio return with the square
root of the number of firms forming the portfolio for that month. The intercept  is
considered the average abnormal monthly return of the event-portfolio across all 12, 24
or 36 months.
Since investors can be misled, and in addition the performance of the company
itself may not reveal enough about earnings management, I also collect the annual
amounts the SWORD entity contributed to the research and development company
(what the company recognized as revenues from the SWORD) from the ARS forms of
the parent company. To find the effect each SWORD formation has on revenues, R&D
expenses, net income and finally earnings per share, I assume the company did not
form a SWORD structure but raised the gross proceeds through the issuance of its own
equity. The number of shares needed to raise the gross proceeds is calculated as gross
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proceeds divided by the average price of the parent stock in the announcement month.
In the following years, every year there is a split, the number of shares needed to raise
the gross proceeds is adjusted accordingly to reflect the split. If the company raised the
gross proceeds through its own equity issuance, then it would not recognize revenues
from the SWORD, so the annual SWORD contribution is subtracted from the total
revenues and net income. R&D expenses remain the same as when reported with the
SWORD structure since the company includes in its R&D expenses the expenses of
the R&D performed on behalf of the SWORD. The adjusted net income is then
calculated as net income – SWORD revenues + total cost of acquisition (if any other
SWORD by the same company was acquired at the same year) or the cash part of the
acquisition in the case of royalty payments (there is a cash payment typically at the
time of acquisition and future royalties depending on net sales).The earnings per share
are calculated as net income divided by weighted number of outstanding shares. To
calculate the adjusted earnings per share, the SWORD contribution is now eliminated
and is subtracted from the net income. The adjusted earnings per share are calculated
by dividing the adjusted net income by the sum of the weighted number of outstanding
shares and the number of shares needed to raise the gross proceeds. The percentage
change (  ) in earnings per share is calculated as
100 ( adjusted earnings per share earnings per share )EPS *
earnings per share

  .
Companies which report better adjusted earnings are companies that would have
shown better EPS if they had raised the gross proceeds through issuance of their own
equity. By better I mean reduce their losses, increase positive earnings, or move from
negative EPS to positive. The opposite is true for companies with the worst adjusted
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EPS. The analysis is performed every year a SWORD contributes from years 0, the
announcement year to 5 years after the announcement year. A large and statistically
significant impact would indicate intent to mislead, and therefore it will satisfy the
second condition of earnings management (intent to mislead).
Finally I perform the same analysis for companies forming single and multiple
SWORD structures and measure in the same way the combined effect they have in a
fiscal year on the parent company’s revenues, R&D expenses, net income and earnings
per share.
5.2 Tests for the “debt overhang” and “debt insurance” problems hypothesis
To test for the presence of the debt overhang and if the use of the SWORD and
R&D LP structures helps reduce or eliminate the problem, first I determine the
amount of debt the sample companies have in their structure. If I find that they were
heavily in debt and the interest expense was high, then this is an indication that the
sample companies were faced with the ‘debt overhang’ and ‘debt insurance’ problems.
If this is true then I proceed, using the methodology of Hennesy (2004).
The independent variable is R&D normalized by total assets at the end of the
year prior to the announcement (Minton and Schrand, 1999) since I am interested in
the R&D investment and not in capital investment.
The market to book ratio (Minton and Schrand, 1999) is used as an empirical
proxy for growth opportunities. I predict a positive relation between the normalized
investment in R&D and growth opportunities.
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HIGH (Hennesy, 2004), is a dummy variable that equals 1 for companies with
bond rating above investment grade (above BB+) and 0 otherwise. It is easier for firms
with bond ratings above investment grade to borrow additional funds for investment,
and therefore I predict a positive relationship between the variable HIGH and the
dependent variable R&D normalized by capital stock.
A variable R, (Hennessy, 2004) is the imputed market value of the lender’s
recovery claim in default. R is also normalized by total assets at the end of the previous
year. R (Hennessy) is an empirical proxy for debt overhang. The explanation for the
computation of R is described in Appendix B by Hennessy) and is the following:
20
1
ˆ( ) *( )*j jt t
t
R rr LTD d

 
  
 

jrr are recovery ratios by three digit SIC code industries and they are provided by
Altman and Kishore (1996) who compute averages from 1975 to 1995.
*jrr LTD are collections in the event of default.
jt are default probabilities by bond rating over a twenty year horizon and they are
provided by Moody’s.
td is a discount factor based on long-term treasuries.
20
1
jt t
t
d

 
 
 
 is the value of a hitting claim paying one dollar at default.
ˆ( )R is the product of the recovery ratio, long term debt and the value of the hitting
claim.
A negative relation is predicted between R and R&D.
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CF is a variable for cash flows which is computed as net income + depreciation
(Whited, 1992; Hennessy, 2004) and is also normalized by the end of the year, prior to
the announcement, total assets. A positive relation is predicted for cash flows and the
normalized investment in R&D.
The final model is a modified version of the Hennesy model using ordinary least
squares (OLS) and is as follows:
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The null hypothesis tested is that 2b is equal to 0.
5.3 Tests for the information asymmetries hypothesis
To test if the unbundling of growth opportunities results in the reduction of
information asymmetries and if the companies which formed SWORD structures
exhibited higher information asymmetries than their matching samples, I use the
methodology developed by Krishnaswami and Subramanian (1999).
The first proxy for information asymmetries is the earnings forecast error and it
is calculated as the ratio of the absolute difference between forecasted earnings and
actual earnings per share to the price share at the beginning of the month for both my
sample firms and their matched firms. Forecasted earnings are the mean monthly
earnings forecast for the last month of the fiscal year prior to the announcement year.
Higher earnings forecasted errors indicate higher information asymmetries.
The second proxy is the standard deviation of all earnings forecasts made in the
last month of the fiscal year preceding the year of the announcement and is a
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measurement of the dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecast. Higher dispersion of
opinion among analysts indicates a higher level of information asymmetries.
The third measurement of information asymmetries is the residual standard
deviation and is calculated as the residual volatility in the market adjusted daily stock
returns in the year preceding and following the announcement (Bhagat et al., 1985;
Blackwell et al., 1990; Krishnaswami et al., 1999; Krishnaswami and Subramanian,
1999). It captures the firm–specific uncertainty faced by investors.
The three information asymmetry proxies are calculated for the SWORD
forming sample, their R&D to sales and book-to-market matching samples for years -1
and +1 relative to the announcement year. The same procedure is followed for
companies which issued their own stock and warrants or stock only to finance R&D.
Pair wise comparisons are employed to detect differences in the information
asymmetries between the samples and between the years. If the hypothesis is true, the
SWORD forming sample should have higher information asymmetry levels than the
other samples and these levels should decrease in the years following the formation of
the SWORD entity.
5.4 Tests for the separation of assets of different risk classes hypothesis
In the development of the hypothesis, I hypothesize that one of the possible
explanations for the use of the SWORD companies as a means of pursuing some
growth opportunities is the fact that the parent company can reduce its systematic risk
by separating the subset of the growth opportunities with the highest systematic risk
(beta) and establishing them as separate companies while maintaining the option to
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acquire them if their research and development projects are successful. Following the
methodology of Boehme and Sorescu (2002), I estimate changes in risk loadings of the
Fama-French (1993) and Carhart (1997) four factor model
i ,t f ,t i t i i m,t f ,t i t i t i t
i t m,t f ,t i t t i t t i t t
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A regression is performed separately for each company and for the months -36 to +36
relative to the announcement (month 0, the announcement month is not included in the
regression). tD is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the data is from the
post-event period and 0 otherwise. The regression coefficients i i i i, , h , m    
according to Boehme and Sorescu represent changes in the loadings of the four factor
Fama-French and Carhart model. i ,t f ,tR R is the excess return the company earns
when compared to the one month treasury bill; the explanatory variables are (1)
m fR r , the excess return on the market, when market is the value-weighted return on
all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks (from CRSP) minus the one-month Treasury
bill rate, (2) SMB (Small Minus Big) is the average return on the three small portfolios
minus the average return on the three big portfolios (3) HML (High Minus Low) is the
average return on the two value portfolios minus the average return on the two growth
portfolios, and (4) MOM is the average return on the two high prior return portfolios
minus the average return on the two low prior return portfolios. The hypotheses tested
are (1) the mean and median of the regression coefficients are equal to 0 and (2) the
mean and median changes in the four factor loadings are equal to 0.
Since betas and standard deviations of returns don’t capture all risk, I use the
methodology developed by Schultz (1993) to determine if the SWORD formation
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increases the survivability odds of the SWORD forming companies. Following the
methodology of Schultz (1993) a company is characterized as a non-survivor if it has a
delisting code in the 500s (excluding codes 501-520) in the 5 years following the
SWORD announcement year. The logistic regression
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3
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is used to estimate the effect of forming a SWORD entity on the probability of the
company surviving the next 5 years. The sample is comprised of 36 companies which
formed SWORD entities for the first time and their 36 matching companies. The
dependent variable is SURV which takes the value 1 if the company survives in the
next 5 years and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are SWORD, which equals 1 if
the company formed a SWORD structure and 0 otherwise, the logarithm of sales (SLS,
expressed in millions), and the logarithm of age (AGE, expressed in months). The
hypothesis tested is the coefficient i of the logistic regression is zero.
5.5 Tests for the sequential financing hypothesis
If the hypothesis of sequential financing is true, then I should observe one or both
of the following facts : i) the warrants are “in the money” around the time of the
acquisition and/or the warrants are “in the money” at the time of their expiration so
that they can provide the company with additional capital as the company grows (Since
the sample companies are high growth companies and in their majority don’t pay
dividends, warrants are treated as European call options exercisable at the time of their
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expiration), and ii) the method of payment should be mainly new shares or even
warrants.
43
Chapter 6. Sample description
My initial sample consisted of 117 formation announcements appearing on the
Dow Jones News Retrieval System. From the initial announcements, seven
announcements were dropped because they concerned the formation of a different type
of structure called the asset and risk redeployment option with warrants (ARROW). An
ARROW structure, although it is similar to the SWORD structure, has a major
difference with the SWORD. There is no new financing raised since the parent
company becomes the sole financier of the ARROW company, at least in the initial
phase. The shares of the new company are distributed to the existing shareholders of
the parent company on a pro-rata basis and are treated as a special dividend by the
parent company. Two of the seven announcements were made by two companies,
Ligand and Allergan, and they were about the formation of the same ARROW
company named Allergan Ligand Retinoid Therapeutics, Inc. Five announcements
were dropped because they concerned the formation of spin-offs (3) and other
financing mechanisms. One SWORD formation announcement was dropped because it
was later withdrawn due to bad market conditions. Twenty announcements were
dropped because they were venture capitalists of R&D funds. Ten announcements
were dropped because I did not find the name of the partnership and therefore couldn’t
classify it. Finally I dropped 8 announcements because either the firm did not have
CRSP data at the announcement time or Ihad the final decision announcement but not
the formation announcement.
< insert table 1 about here >
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The final sample consists of 66 announcements made by 41 different
companies between 1980 (G T WE Corporation) and 1998 (Elan Corporation). The
maximum number of SWORD structures made by a single company is 6 such
structures, and they were formed by Centocor from 1983 through 1991, followed by
Elan (4) Genentech (4) and Genzyme (4).
SWORD structures were lengthy investments. The mean (median) time from
formation to acquisition was 45.7 (38.3) months. The longest SWORD deal was
between Genzyme Corp. and Genzyme Development Partners, L.P. (GDP) which
lasted 11.3 years. The partnership was formed in 1989 and acquired in 2001. The
shortest deal (1.02 years)was between Perseptive Biosystems Inc. and Perseptive
Technologies Corp. The mean (median) duration time length from formation until the
last call exercise date to purchase the SWORD entity was 4.5 (4.7) years. The longest
period for the research and development company to exercise its call was 6.3 years
while the shortest period to last call exercise was 3.1 years. SWORD structures
therefore are long-term investments.
From table 1 it is evident that the majority of the R&D programs which were
financed through SWORD structures were in the preclinical, phase 1, phase 2 and
phase 3 of clinical trials stages, the costlier phases. DiMasi (2001) finds that the 3-year
moving average for the US clinical phase (Phase WE, Phase II, and Phase III clinical
trials) is 5.7 years in the 1980s and 6.4 years in the 1990s. The average time for the
research and development company to exercise its call, the development stage of the
R&D programs when the SWORD structures were formed, the accounting treatment of
R&D and the impact it could have on the R&D company’s income statement provide
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partial support for the earnings management and separation of different risk class
hypotheses.
The cost of setting up the SWORD structures is relatively high as shown from
22 such structures with available data. The average flotation cost is 10.16 percent of
the gross proceeds while the median cost is 8.64 percent of them. Beatty et al. (1995)
find that the cost of setting R&D LPs is 13.98% of the gross proceeds and 6.75% for
the R&D financial organizations11. Lee et al. (1996) find that direct flotation costs
(underwriting spreads and other direct expenses as a percentage of gross proceeds) of
initial public offerings (IPOs) are 11 percent and 7.1 percent for seasoned equity
offerings (SEOs). Based on the findings of Lee et al. (1996), the costs of setting up
SWORD structures are less than the direct costs of issuing IPOs and a little higher than
the costs of selling seasoned equity.
For the acquisition cost, I assumed that all warrants issued in connection with
the unit offering were still outstanding at the acquisition time. The Black-Scholes
(1973) formula for European call options was used to estimate the value of the
outstanding warrants. Following Yermack (1995), the 120, prior to the exercise date,
logarithmic stock returns * 254 were used to estimate the annualized volatility of the
research and development company’s stock. The interest rates used in the calculation
of the option value were obtained from the Federal Bank of St. Louis and were the
U.S. treasury, constant maturity interest rates for the same time period as the remaining
time to the longest exercise date of the warrants. To the taxable income (Compustat
11 For further information about flotation costs, Eckbo, Masulis and Norli offer detailed information
about different types of security offerings in a 2005 working paper titled “Security Offerings: A
Survey.”
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intem 170) I added the cost of acquisition, as reported by the company. If the sum was
greater than 0, then I used the historical corporate rates obtained from the website of
the IRS to estimate the tax savings resulting from the acquisition costs. I then
estimated the annual percentage rate, using as present value the gross proceeds, and
future value of the sum of the acquisition costs and the warrant values minus the tax
savings. In addition the continuously compounded effective annual rate (EAR)
1APREAR e  was also computed. I find that the overall annual cost of capital is less
than half the returns venture capitalists earned for companies that went public
(Gompers, 1995, 59 percent annual return). The average APR is 26.48 percent while
the median is 28.15. The findings are in agreement with the claims of the Tocor II
investors in their lawsuit. Tocor investors claim that SWORD investors earn about 30
percent annually on their investment. This finding suggests that SWORD structures
were more efficient (lower cost of capital) than venture capital, and this fact partially
explains their use as financing mechanisms.
From the 66 SWORD formations, 46 SWORD structures or the rights to their
technology (80.70 percent of the SWORD formations whose outcome is known) are
acquired (4 of these structures are acquired after litigation), 7 are not acquired (2
involve litigation), 1 is liquidated after litigation, 3 are still operating and in one of
these SWORD structures, the research and development company has a 70 percent
equity ownership. Finally, the outcome of the remaining 9 SWORD structures could
not be determined. It is evident from the incidence of litigations that there are large
agency problems between the investors of the SWORD structures, their CEO and
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directors and the management of the research and development companies, and the
SWORD structure not only does not reduce them, but it rather exacerbates them.
Through the SEC filings of the research and development companies, I was
able to establish the payment method for 44 acquisitions. The research and
development companies agreed to pay cash and royalties on the future net sales of the
products developed for the SWORD entity for 14 acquisition deals. Only cash was
paid for 7 SWORD acquisitions. The remaining 23 acquisitions (52.27 percent of them
) were accomplished through various combinations of cash, royalties, shares, new
warrants and contingent value rights (CVRs).
< insert table 2 about here >
There is no clustering in the chronological distribution of SWORD structures as
is shown in table 2. The highest concentration, 7 SWORD announcements, is in 1983,
and they are all private placements. From the 66 SWORD structures, 46 structures are
formed through private offerings, and twenty are formed through public offerings.
Prior research,(Wu,2004; Cronqvist and Nilsson,2005), has shown that private
placement companies face higher information asymmetries than public placement and
rights offering firms respectively, even among high technology firms (Wu). The fact
that 46 SWORD structures (69.70 percent) are formed through private placements
supports my information asymmetries hypothesis, as evidenced by the type of offering
they make.
< insert table 3 about here >
All companies which formed SWORD structures operate in high technology
sectors as evidenced by table 3. Forty-three SWORD structures (65.15 percent) are
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formed by companies operating in the drug industry (3 digit SIC 283). The remaining
23 SWORD structures are also formed by companies operating in high growth, R&D
intensive industries, such as computers, software development and medical apparatus.
Companies that operate in sectors characterized as high technology have high
information asymmetries between themselves and potential investors. These
information asymmetries can be reduced but not mitigated by partial disclosure. The
fear of imitation by competitors prevents these companies from full disclosure and as a
result they can access capital at much higher costs than firms that operate in other
manufacturing sectors.
< insert table 4 about here >
Supportive of the information asymmetries hypothesis is the fact that 33 of the
41 companies (80.49 percent) which formed SWORD structures for the first time used
private placements vs. only 8 companies which used public issues. The average age of
companies that formed SWORD structures for the first time is only 5.38 years, with the
median age only 2.66 years. When companies became older (mean age 6.5 years,
median age 5.35 years) and formed subsequent SWORD structures, they did so
through 13 private placements and 12 public issues. The sub-sample of companies
which formed subsequent SWORDs therefore shows that companies in the earlier
stages of their life-cycle, when information asymmetries are extreme, form SWORD
structures through predominantly private placements, and they form subsequent
SWORDs through a balanced distribution of public and private offerings in later stages
when information asymmetries are not so extreme.
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Research and development companies which formed SWORD structures are
not small in terms of market value when assigned to deciles. The smallest companies
were in deciles 3 (3 companies that formed 4 SWORD structures) when classified
according to their market value at the end of the year prior to the announcement year
and against all companies available in CRSP at that year. The median decile for the full
sample was decile 8 while 5 companies which formed 6 SWORD structures were in
decile 10. When they are classified according to their size, however, as small, medium,
or large capitalization, they are mostly small and medium capitalization firms.
Firms with high growth opportunities face more financial constraints than other
firms, all other things equal (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997 and 2000; Korajczyk and
Levy, 2003; Lamont et al., 2001). By financial constraints I mean the gap between the
costs of internal and external financing (Kaplan and Zingales). Typically a company is
considered financially constrained if its market-to-book ratio is greater than one
(Korajczyk and Levy). The average Tobin’s Q, one of the five factors used to calculate
the modified KZ index (Lamont et al., 2001) contributes positively to the index. Since
a higher KZ value indicates a higher degree of financial constraint, this means that all
other things being equal, firms with higher Q face more financial constraints. The
market-to-book ratio of equity is also an indicator of the growth opportunities of
companies. To examine the level of growth opportunities for our firms I use two
proxies. The first proxy is the end of fiscal year
MV of Equity
BV of Equity
, market value of equity at the
end of fiscal year (25 x 199) / book value of equity (60).
The second proxy I use for growth opportunities is the average Tobin’s Q as
calculated in the modified KZ index (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997, Lamont et al., 2001).
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More analytically Q = [total assets (6) + December market value of equity (24 x 25) –
common equity total (60) – deferred taxes (74)] / total assets (6). Both ratios show that
the SWORD forming companies in year -1 had very high market-to-book values and
Q. The mean (median) ratio for the full sample’s market to book value of equity and Q
ratios is 5.98 (3.69) and 3.45 (3.10). The two ratios indicate that companies forming
SWORD structures are high growth companies. High growth companies have a higher
portion of their values coming from growth opportunities, and they are hard to
evaluate. In addition, the costs of financial distress are higher for these companies,
which can explain the choice of equity instead of debt as a financing mechanism.
The research and development intensity ratio is a measure of how intensively
the company is investing in R&D. If firms invest heavily in R&D, the future prospects
of their investment are highly uncertain, and this can lead to higher costs of accessing
external capital (Chan et al. 2001). Although there is no clear relation between R&D
and stock returns, Chan et al. find that R&D intensity, measured as
& / ,R D MV of Equity is highly correlated with earnings volatility. Additionally the
authors find that firms with high & /R D MV of Equity ratios tended to be
underperformers in the past, and to outperform their matching counterparts in the years
following high & /R D MV of Equity ratios (5.39 percent excess returns per year in the
following 3 years after the portfolio formation). A possible explanation according to
Chan et al, is that investors “sluggishly” adjust their estimates for firms having high
& /R D MV of Equity ratios. If companies underperformed in the past, then their
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management has a strong incentive to show better earnings in the present and the
future. An easy way to increase earnings is to cut R&D expenditures because of the
expensing accounting treatment. If, however, managers of underperforming firms
continue to invest heavily in R&D, this implies that they are optimistic about the future
prospects of their R&D programs and are willing to bear for some time the negative
impact of lower earnings. The “sluggish” reaction can also be explained by the nature
of R&D, which is highly uncertain, and the level of information asymmetries that exist
between the management of the company and its potential investors.
I construct the R&D intensity ratios in two ways. The first ratio is simply
& ,R D Sales R&D expense (46)/sales (net) (12), and the second R&D ratio is
& / ,R D MV of Equity R&D expense (46) / (Price-Calendar Year-Close (24) *
Common Shares Outstanding (25)). Both ratios are used by Chan et al. as measures of
R&D intensity.
The R&D to sales ratio indicates that the sample firms have higher mean
(median) R&D to sales ratios, 167.24 percent (35.76 percent), even when I compare
them to the industry which, according to Chan et al. (2001), invested more heavily in
R&D than any other United States industry, the computer programming, software, &
services (SIC code 737, R&D to sales ratio 16.6 percent). Companies that formed
SWORD structures for the first time (when they were younger and with fewer sales)
exhibit the highest average ratio, 233.21 percent, while companies which formed
public SWORDs had the lowest average ratio, 81.81 percent.
Financial leverage ratios have played an important role in determining the level
of financial distress (Altman, 1968, Z-score) and financial constraints (Kaplan and
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Zingales, 1997, KZ index) a company faces. Higher leverage ratios increase financial
distress and the financial constraints of a company, according to both measures. In
addition high leverage ratios indicate the presence of debt overhang and debt insurance
problems.
To examine the financial leverage of my companies I calculate 4 different
financial leverage ratios. The first financial leverage ratio is from the KZ index
(Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Lamont et al., 2001)
Financial leverage 1 =
end of fiscal
LTD
Market valueof equity
[long term debt (9) / MV of
equity (25*199)]
Financial leverage 2=
end of fiscal
LTD STD
Market valueof equity
 [(long term debt (9) + short
term debt (34))/ MV of Equity (25*199)]
Financial leverage 3 = LTD
TA
, [Long term debt (9) / total assets (6)]
Financial leverage 4 = ,LTD STD
TA
 [Long term debt (9) + short term debt (34))/ total
assets (6)]
All four ratios are very low. The highest median value for the full sample is
only 6.86 percent [(LTD+STD)/TA]. Companies which formed SWORD structures for
the first time were the most heavily leveraged, with mean(median) values for financial
leverage 4, 14.45 (7.21) percent. Although the finding is surprising, it can be explained
by the fact that total assets for companies forming SWORDs for the first time are
smaller and therefore exhibit higher leverage ratios. Royce Laboratories in 1991 had
the highest leverage ratio LTD/TA of 99 percent. Several companies were not
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leveraged at all. Sixteen companies had 0 long term debt (25.5 percent) while 15 of
them (24.2 percent) had also no short term debt. The low financial ratios are not
supportive of the ‘debt overhang’ and ‘debt insurance’ hypothesis. In addition the low
leverage ratios show that there was no need to ‘hide’ debt in the balance sheets of their
SWORD structures, a fact that is not supportive of the earnings management
hypothesis.
To examine the profitability of the sample companies I use the following
proxies:
1. Operating income before depreciation (13) in years -2 and -1
2. Net income (loss) (172) for years -2 and -1
3. Operating income to total assets for years -1
4. Net income at year -1 to market value of equity at year -1
For the full sample, the mean (median) operating income before depreciation in
years -2 and -1, are 11.95 (-.09) and 13.99 (0.18) million respectively. The mean
(median) net income in years -2 and -1 are 3.31 (0.12) and 5.41 (0.75) percent.
Companies which formed subsequent SWORDs had the highest median operating and
net incomes in both years -2 and -1 while companies that formed SWORD structures
for the first time had the lowest. The two mean profitability ratios are both negative in
year -1, -4.01 percent for the operating income to total assets and -0.68 percent for the
net income to the market value of the companies. Companies that formed SWORD
structures for the first time had the most negative average profitability ratios, -8.5 and -
1.28 percent. The operating income, the net income and the profitability measures
indicate that the sample companies needed external funding to finance at least part of
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their R&D projects since they did not generate enough funds internally. If the sample
companies experienced losses, then according to Healy (1985), they would not mind
increasing their losses and they would try to accelerate write-offs and expenses,
increasing thereby their losses for the year, a practice known as “taking a bath.” The
development stage of the companies, combined with the low or negative operating and
net incomes and the strong positive returns, indicate that market participants do not pay
much attention to operating and profitability performance at this stage. Additional
losses or decreases in profitability because of increased R&D investment for the
sample firms will not have the same impact as for mature firms. These facts are not
supportive of the earnings management hypothesis.
Since it is apparent from the median operating and net incomes that the R&D
companies did not generate enough cash through their operations, then to examine the
need for cash I constructed 4 cash burn rates. The cash burn rates indicate how long (in
years) the R&D companies would have survived with cash they had at the end of year -
1 if no additional cash was generated and they had to pay for the R&D expense and the
interest expense in year 0 and finally total current liabilities of year -1 and these
expenses remained at these levels in perpetuity.
The four cash burn rate ratios are
Cash burn ratio1 = 1
0&
Cash
R D
 , cash(1) at year -1 /R&D expenditures (46) in year 0
Cash burn ratio 2 = 1
0
Cash
Interest Expense
 , cash(1) at year -1 /interest expense (15) in year
0
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Cash burn ratio 3 = 1
0 0( & )
Cash
R D Interest Expense


cash(1) at year -1 / (R&D
expense(46) in year 0 + interest expense (15) in year 0)
Cash burn ratio 4 = 1
0 0 1( & )
Cash
R D Interest Expense Current Liabilities


 
cash (1) at year
-1 / (R&D expense(46) in year 0+ interest expense (15) in year 0+ current liabilities
(5) in year -1).
The cash burn ratio 1 indicates that although the R&D companies had poor
operating performance and low net incomes or even losses at the end of year -1, they
had enough cash to survive for more than 1.51 years, if R&D was the only expenditure
and remained at the same levels as in year 0. The cash burn ratio 2 further indicates
that R&D companies have very little interest expenses. The median cash burn rate is
29 years if the interest expense remained at the same levels as in year 0 and it was the
only expense. The cash burn rates increase dramatically, however, if I also consider
total current liabilities at the end of year -1. Cetus Corporation could survive more than
7.5 years with the cash it had in 1985 and the same R&D and interest expenses and
current liabilities as in year 0 occurred in perpetuity. Royce Corp, on the other hand, in
1990 is in desperate need for cash. The company could survive for only 0.01 years or
about 4 days if no additional cash or credit was available. The full sample would spend
all of its cash in less than a year, if along with the R&D and interest expenses, current
liabilities are considered. The low leverage ratios and the high cash burn rates when
only the interest expense is considered indicate that companies which formed SWORD
structures were not heavily leveraged and did not have to “hide” debt in the balance
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sheets of the SWORD structures. The two findings fail to support the ‘debt overhang’
and the earnings management hypotheses.
A score used widely in the financial literature to classify companies as
financially distressed, gray or healthy is Altman’s (1968) Z-score.
The Z-scores are calculated in the following way
3.3 .999 0.6 1.2 1.4EBIT Net Sales MV of Equity WC REZ score
TA TA TL TA TA
     
Or more analytically
Z-score = 3.3(EBIT(178)/Total Assets(6)) + 0.999(Net Sales(12) / Total Assets(6)) +
0.6 (Market Value of Equity (25 x 199) / Total Liabilities (5)) + 1.2(Working
Capital(179) / Total assets(6)) + 1.4(Retained Earnings(36) / Total Assets(6))
The Z-scores show that the R&D companies are financially healthy in both
years prior to the announcement year, which is typical of young, high growth firms that
have high market values and few liabilities. Both the mean (23.60) and the median
values (16.79) for year -1 are far above the necessary score to be classified as healthy.
The prior stock performance of the companies can partially explain why the
sample companies did not issue equity of their own. The trend in stock performance
reveals that the median return for the full sample declines from 26.56 percent in year -2
to 20.15 percent in year -1. Ecogen in 1991 has a raw return of more than 600 percent.
Its price climbs from 1.625 dollars at the end of 1990 to 11.50 dollars at the end of
1991. Genetics Institute has the lowest return (-61.91) in year 1986. Companies which
formed SWORD structures for the first time experience the most dramatic median
decrease. From a median return of 68.45 percent in year -2 the median return falls to
7.35 percent in year –1, and this can be the reason why they issued equity of a separate
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entity. Overall, companies that formed SWORDs had very strong stock performance in
year -2 (average 60.05 percent for the full sample). The stock performance continues to
be strong in year -1 (37.05) but is not as strong as in year -2.
< insert table 5 about here >
To compare the sample following the advise of Barber and Lyon (1997) for a one-to-
one match, I construct a matching sample based on the most important risk
characteristic of the sample companies, the R&D intensity, which is measured as R&D
expenses to sales. The matching is done in year –1, and the requirement is that the
R&D intensity ratio of the matching form is within ±25 percent of the R&D ratio of the
corresponding sample firm and the matching firm operates in the same 3-digit code
industry as the sample company.
The benchmarked ratios of the SWORD companies and their R&D intensity
ratios are presented in table 5. The benchmarked financial leverage ratios show that the
sample companies were not more leveraged than their R&D intensity matching sample,
which fails to support the debt overhang and debt insurance hypothesis.
Companies which formed SWORD structures were more profitable (or they
had smaller losses) than their matching sample. The average adjusted operating income
to total assets in year -1 is 33.66 percent, and the median is 16.39 percent. The average
adjusted ratio of net income to market value is 12.12 percent, and the adjusted median
is 3.10 percent (all statistically significant at the 1 percent level of significance).
The stock performance of the sample companies is also superior to the stock
performance of their matching sample in year -1. The mean (median) abnormal returns
for the full sample are 41.99 (29.82) percent, and they are both statistically significant
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at the 5 percent level of significance. The higher profitability and stock performance of
the sample companies when compared to their matching sample only raises additional
questions regarding the motives for forming SWORD structures.
< insert table 6a about here >
To examine if the sample companies had other characteristics than their
industry averages I also benchmark the sample companies against their 4-digit
industry. I find that the sample companies invested less in R&D, had less leverage,
were more profitable, and had better stock performance than their industry average.
The statistical results are statistically significant but hard to interpret. Since the
industries are small and there are many outliers, we also benchmark the sample
companies against their industry medians.
< insert table 6b about here >
When the benchmark is the industry median, the results are clear. Companies
which formed SWORD structures for the first time, have higher mean (median) R&D
to sales than their industry median (199.70 and 11.29 percent), and the difference is
statistically significant at the 5 and 1 percent respectively. The sample companies are
not more leveraged or profitable than their industry median. The sub-sample which
shows statistically significant results is the sub-sample that formed subsequent
SWORDs. The mean (median) adjusted operating income to total assets is 8.92(13.05)
percent and they are statistically significant at the 5 percent level of significance. The
adjusted median stock returns in both years -2 and -1 are positive, 24.96 and 12.06, and
statistically significant at the 1 and 10 percent levels of significance. Both the
comparisons with the R&D matching and the industry median tell the same story. The
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sample companies were more profitable and had better stock performance than both
benchmarks. The stock performance, however, declines in year -1. Prospect theory,
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) and, most specifically, anchoring, posit that a decline
in returns can be perceived as loss by investors even though the returns are still
positive, and this perception could have deterred the R&D companies from raising
capital through issuance of their own equity in year 0 if they believed the market
would undervalue their own equity.
Three additional samples are collected to compare the market reaction to the
SWORD announcements. The first sample consists of all the news announcements in
DJN and Lexis Nexis of seasoned equity issuance by the same companies. Then the
one closest and prior to the SWORD announcement (within a two year period) with
data available on CRSP was picked. This yielded a sample of 19 such issues, all public.
< insert table 7 about here >
The second sample consists of all announcements made by companies between
1978 and 2004 concerning the issuance of stock and warrants to finance only R&D.
The final sample consists of 38 companies. The mean(median) flotation cost is 7.03
(6.87). It is apparent from table 9 that the stages of the programs financed through the
issuance of the company’s own equity and warrants are in later stages of development.
They are predominantly in clinical phases 3.
< insert table 8 about here >
Only 2 companies issued public stock and warrants. The 36 remaining
companies placed their offerings privately. From the chronological distribution in table
10 it is shown that these types of offerings start in 1983 and end in 2004. There is a
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clustering of offerings in years 2002 through 2004, with 50 percent of the sample
making offerings in these years. Surprisingly only one company which formed a
SWORD structure had this type of offering (CliniTherm, 1983), and this is the earliest
offering. The chronological distribution also shows that they start becoming popular
after the formation of the last SWORD in 1998. This can be a partial explanation as to
why we don’t observe any SWORD formations after 1998.
< insert table 9 about here >
Companies which offered stock and warrants to finance R&D operate mainly in
the drug sector, 34 companies (89.5 percent). The rest are in computers, biological
services and medical and surgical apparatus.
< insert table 10 about here >
The third sample, of 33 offerings, consists of only stock offerings to finance
R&D. The mean(median) flotation costs were 5.33 (5.80) percent and were typically
used to finance stages 2 and 3.
< insert table 11 about here >
Again the preferred method of offering is through private placements. Thirty of
the 33 offerings were made through private placements. The offerings are clustered
between 1999 and 2001, when 20 of the 33 (60.61 percent of the sample) are made.
The first such offering is made in 1989.
< insert table 12 about here >
The majority of the companies (30 of the 33) operate in the pharmaceutical
industry. The remaining are search, detection, navigation, guidance, aeronautical &
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nautical (2) and instruments for measuring & testing of electricity & electrical signals
(1).
< insert table 13 about here >
A comparison of the adjusted gross proceeds raised through the 3 different
methods, the SWORD units, stock and warrant and stock only, shows that the gross
proceeds raised through the SWORD structure are substantially bigger than the two
other offerings. However, when I compare the ratio of gross proceeds to market value,
I find that there are no differences. The last finding indicates that SWORD forming
companies are bigger companies when compared to the other two samples.
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Chapter 7. Empirical results
< insert table 14a about here >
To examine the earnings management hypothesis an event study was
conducted. The results are shown in table 14a. This event study shows that the R&D
companies earned a statistically significant positive return (3.19 percent, statistically
significant at the 10 percent level of significance) in the period -5 +5. There is no
statistically significant cumulative average abnormal return, however, during the event
window (0 to +1, 0.34 percent) with the median cumulative abnormal return positive
and statistically significant at the 5 percent level of significance. For the private issues
the reaction is positive from day -5 to +5, 3.01 percent with the biggest portion of
returns occurring between days -5 to 0 (2.53 percent). The positive market reaction is
consistent with the findings of Wruck (1989) (1.89 percent) , Hertzel and Smith (1993)
(1.72 percent) and Hertzel Lemmon, Linck and Rees (2002) (2.4 percent) about
positive market reaction around the announcement of private equity issuance.
The market reaction to public announcements surprisingly is positive.12 The
average cumulative abnormal return is 3.60, and the median cumulative abnormal
return is positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The difference with
prior literature findings can be partially attributed to the composition of the offering
(stock of one company and warrants of another).
12 Eckbo, Masulis and Norli, 2005, Security offerings: a survey, working paper.Table13 details the short
term studies which document negative market reaction to announcements of SEO (especially firm
commitments) as classified by the flotation method.
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The market reaction is generally neutral or positive and consistent with the
view that investors do not consider SWORD structures as earnings management tools.
If investors are rational, then the earnings management hypothesis should be rejected.
The same event study is conducted for the 3 additional samples. The market
reaction to announcements of seasoned stock offerings by the sample companies prior
to a SWORD formation announcement is strongly negative and statistically significant
(panel B). The average abnormal return on day 0, the announcement day, is -2.47
percent, with only 15.80 percent of the companies experiencing positive abnormal
returns. In the event window, days 0 to +1, the cumulative average abnormal return
(CAAR) is -3.33 and is statistically significant at the 1 percent level of significance.
From day +2 to day +30 the CAAR is -13.03 (statistically significant at the 5 percent
level). The strong negative reaction to equity issuance prior to a SWORD formation
provides a partial explanation for the choice of the parent company to form a SWORD
structure instead of raising capital for R&D through the issuance of its own equity in
the form of an indirect cost which is the negative market reaction to the
announcement13.
The results of the event study for the two additional samples are reported in
table 14, panel B. The market reaction for the whole sample is positive (3.76 percent in
day 0) but not statistically significant. This is reversed on days +2 to +30 when the
CAAR is -2.39. The explanation for the positive reaction provided by Wruck (1989) is
that private placements of equity enhance firm value through the change in ownership
concentration.
13 See Eckbo, Norli and Masulis, 2005, for more information on the direct and indirect costs of equity
issuance.
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The market reaction to announcements of stock and warrant offerings to
finance R&D is negative on day 0 (-1.76) but positive, 8.84 percent, in the period -5,
+5 with positive CAARs in periods -5 to -1 (3.11 percent) and 0 to +5 (5.73 percent).
None of the cumulative average abnormal returns is statistically significant, however.
The above results imply that the purpose of the proceeds used and the type of offering
are important determinants of the market reaction.
< insert table 14b about here >
To measure the market perception of the acquisitions and terminations, the
same type of event study was also conducted for both of them. A strong negative
reaction signals that market participants view the acquisition as costly to the parent
company. In contrast, a positive reaction signals that the market views the cost of
acquisition as fair to the parent company or even low. In the acquisitions
announcements I exclude the announcements regarding tender offers (4 tender offers).
The final sample consists of 31 acquisition announcements and 6 termination
announcements. The market reaction to the announcements of acquisitions is neutral.
The average abnormal return on day 0 is 1.05 percent, and between days 0 to +1 it is
0.74. It is apparent from this neutral reaction that the market anticipated the
acquisitions. The nonnegative reaction further shows that the market felt the
acquisition terms were fair for the parent company.
Surprisingly, the reaction to termination announcements is positive. Companies
earn average abnormal cumulative returns of 5.98 percent on days 0 through 1
(statistically significant at the 1 percent level of significance) with all 6 companies
earning positive abnormal cumulative returns. Five of the 6 companies continue to earn
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strong positive returns, 20.03 percent, from days +2 to +30. The small number of
termination announcements makes the interpretation of the findings hard.
< insert table 15 about here >
The results of the buy and hold study are mixed. Companies which form
SWORD entities perform better, and the difference in their performance is statistically
significant better than the value weighted index, the R&D to sales matching sample,
the 4-digit SIC, ROA and size matching sample and the 3-digit SIC and size matching
sample. The sample companies continue to outperform the same benchmarks in year –
1, but their difference is not statistically significant. In years +1, +2, +3 the sample
companies outperform only the R&D to sales matching sample, and this difference is
statistically significant. The sample companies’ performance is comparable to the
value weighted index, the R&D to market value matching sample, the size and book-
to-market and book-to-market only matching samples. The mixed results when
different benchmarks are used prohibit me from making any strong inferences since the
results are not robust to the sample selection methodology.
< insert table 16 about here >
To address concerns about the compounding effects in the buy and hold study,
the portfolio methodology was also followed to estimate the abnormal returns for the
periods lasting from -1 month to -12, -24 and -36 months (-1, -2 and -3 years), the pre-
holding period. The same study was also conducted from month +1 to +12, +24 and
+36 months (+1, +2 and +3 years), the post-holding period. The results are presented in
table 16. The portfolio study indicates that the sample companies had superior
performance in the pre-holding period when benchmarked against both the value
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weighted index and the equally weighted index. The results are robust to the estimation
methodology (OLS or WLS). The portfolio approach supports the inference that the
sample companies form SWORD entities after periods of strong performance. In the
years following the SWORD formation I fail to reject the hypothesis that the monthly
abnormal returns of the portfolio are different from zero. This indicates that the
SWORD formation did not help the company show better performance in the years
after the formation. This fact on the surface appears to reject the earnings management
hypothesis.
< insert table 17a about here >
Even though the portfolio methodology suggests that the formation of the
SWORD entities did not help companies show better performance, the question that
remains is whether managers knew they were heading for periods of inferior
performance and through the SWORD formation they were at least able to show
comparable performance. This leads us to the last test for the earnings management
hypothesis, the direct impact the SWORD formations have on revenues, net income
and earnings per share when compared to an alternative traditional method of
financing, seasoned equity offerings of the parent company. The results for years 0, the
year of the announcement, through year +5 and for each SWORD individually are
reported in table 17a. The majority of the companies with data available for each single
SWORD receive the R&D contract revenues by the end of the third year. Forty-seven
companies report revenues in the announcement year, 51 companies in year 1, 43
companies in year 2, 29 in year 3, 11 in year 4, and only 6 companies in year 5. In year
0, the year that the parent company receives its first revenues from the SWORD
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revenues from the SWORD, these revenues are average (median) 14.57 (7.51) percent
of the total revenues for that year. The maximum value is 77.16 percent of total
revenues, and the minimum is 0.17 percent. If the total amount of the SWORD
revenues was considered R&D expense, then the R&D conducted on behalf of the
SWORD entity represents mean (median) 29(18) percent of the total R&D. The
maximum contribution is 155.25 percent (a substantial portion for this was allocated to
management services and not to R&D), and the minimum is 1.08 percent. A substantial
portion, therefore, of the company’s R&D represents R&D performed for the SWORD
entity in year 0. The number of shares needed to raise the gross proceeds, if the
companies chose to finance the R&D through seasoned equity offerings, would have
increased the weighted number of outstanding shares by an average (median) 14.78
(14.56) percent. The potential substantial increase in the number of outstanding shares
could have a big dilutive effect on earnings per share. The reduction of revenues and
net income by the amount of SWORD contribution, the increase of net income by the
cost of acquisition of a SWORD entity if there was an acquisition, and the increase in
the number of outstanding shares had the following effect. The mean value of change
in EPS is 291.26 percent. The mean value is driven by Elan in 1996. The company
reported a loss of 788 thousand dollars. The adjusted income increased by 154 million
the cost of acquisition of another SWORD entity. The company had 89 million shares
and needed an additional 3.425 million to raise the proceeds generated through Axogen
in 1996. The cost of the acquisition, which the company would not have to incur if it
had financed the R&D through issuance of its own equity, caused the adjusted net
income to rise to 153.66 million. The average change in EPS for Elan PLC for that
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year was 18086 percent. This case drives the mean value in changes in EPS. The
median value shows that the median change in EPS would have been a decrease
(increase) in earnings (losses) per share of 19 percent. Consistent with the earnings
management hypothesis, I find that 14 companies would have shown better earnings
per share while 30 would have shown worst.
In year +1, the first year when the parent company receives full payment for its
services, the impact on revenues is even bigger. The average (median) contribution of
the SWORD to total revenues is 20.64 (14.12) percent, and to R&D expense it is 46.33
(33.25) percent. The mean (median) change in earnings per share is -210 (-57) percent.
Only 14 percent of the sample would have shown better earnings in year +1 and 86
percent worse if they had not formed a SWORD entity and had financed through
issuance of their own equity.
In year +2 the SWORD impact on earnings per share is still statistically
significant and positive. Only 2 of the 39 companies would have shown better EPS
through issuance of their own equity while 37 would have shown worst EPS. In years
+3, +4 and +5, although the impact is not statistically significant, it is still positive for
the companies reporting revenues from their SWORDs. In year 3, 18 of the 28
companies show better EPS because of the SWORD structure, in year 4, 6 out of 10,
and in year 5, 4 out of 6. Overall the formation of SWORD entities has a big impact on
revenues, net income and EPS, and this finding is consistent with earnings
management.
< insert table 17b about here >
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In table 17b we report the cumulative effect single and multiple SWORD
entities had on a given company for a year. Earnings per share would have been worse
by 39 percent (median value). From the 146 company years only in 33 years would the
companies have reported better EPS through the issuance of their own stock vs.
forming a SWORD entity. The results in table 17b provide further support for the
earnings management hypothesis.
< insert table 18a about here >
The comparison of the information asymmetry proxies for the sample
companies, their R&D to sales and book to market matching samples in year -1 is
reported in panel A. The sample companies exhibit lower information asymmetry
levels than the R&D to sales matching sample for all information asymmetry proxies,
and these differences are statistically significant. When compared to the book to
market matching sample, SWORD forming companies exhibit the same level of
information asymmetries as their matching sample. In panel B, I report descriptive
statistics and tests for differences of the information asymmetry variables for the
sample company, companies which issued stock and warrants and stock only to
finance R&D. With the exception of the standard deviation of residuals, which
indicates that the sample companies had higher information asymmetries than the other
two samples, the forecasting error and the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts
don’t show statistically significant differences between the two samples. Overall, and
contrary to the information asymmetries hypothesis, I find that the sample companies
did not have higher information asymmetry levels than other companies with similar
characteristics or companies which chose alternative methods of financing R&D and
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the level of the information asymmetries is not reduced in the years following the
SWORD formation..
< insert table 18b about here >
Table 18b reports the descriptive statistics and tests of the information
asymmetry proxies for the sample companies for years -1 and +1 relative to the
announcement year. Although not statistically significant (except for the standard
deviation of analysts’ forecasts), and contrary to the prediction of the information
asymmetry hypothesis, the levels of information asymmetry increase after the SWORD
formation as the market tries to assimilate the information provided by the SWORD
formation. In summary there is no evidence that the sample companies had higher
information levels than other companies of similar characteristics, or that the SWORD
formation reduced information asymmetries for the parent company after the SWORD
formation. My findings are not in agreement with Krishnaswami and Subramaniam
(1999) who find that information asymmetries are reduced for companies completing
corporate spin-offs.
< insert table 19 about here >
To test different risks for the separation of assets, first I use beta as the proxy
for firm risk. The results are reported in table 19 and show that there are no statistically
significant changes in all betas from the pre-holding to the post-holding period. The
results are robust for both the mean and the median values of the betas. There is no
evidence that the betas, as a measurement of risk, declined in the post SWORD
formation period.
< insert table 20 about here >
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Although betas have been widely used as a measure of risk, they don’t capture
all firm risk. It is possible that SWORD structures reduce or eliminate project specific
risk, which can help the parent companies to survive. This is even more important if
companies are small and their survival depends on the research and development of
new products. Companies in the science and technology based industries sometimes
spend years and million of dollars on a single product’s research and development. If
these efforts fail, the chances of survival for the company become very small. Through
the SWORD structure, the company can shift most of that risk to investors who hold
better diversified portfolios and can bear the risk better than the companies. The
survivorship for the sample companies and the R&D to sales matching sample are
reported in table 20. For 34 SWORD forming companies and their matches, the
reasons for their delisting are in panel A. I find that only 2 of the 34 sample companies
were delisted from CRSP within 5 years from the formation year while 14 of the 34
matching companies were delisted in the same period. This finding supports the
survivorship assumption which is implicit in the separation of assets of different risk of
classes’ hypothesis.
To control for other factors such as size (logarithm of sales) and age (logarithm
of age), I run a logit regression including these variables as control variables. The
formation of the first SWORD structures increases the probability of survival by 23
percent. The coefficient of the SPE (1 if it formed a SWORD and 0 otherwise) is
statistically significant at the 1 percent level of significance. Neither sales nor age is
statistically significant in explaining the survivorship of the companies. The high rates
of survival support the separation of assets of different risk classes.
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< insert table 21 about here >
The inclusion of warrants in the SWORD offerings raises the possibility that
SWORD structures can be an efficient financing solution to the sequential investment
problem of R&D. In the sample description there is evidence in the form of payment at
the time of the acquisition which supports the hypothesis. My study directly takes the
values of the warrants included in the offerings from the ARS forms of the parent
company. Although there are several differences in estimating the value of warrants
and the type of offerings (Garner and Marshall, 2005; Chemmanur and Fulgieri, 1997)
I will use proposition 5(a) and 6(a) of Chemmanur and Fulgieri and the findings of
Garner and Marshall to make inferences about the riskiness of the firm offering
SWORD units. Proposition 5(a) states that the number of warrants issued is positively
related to the firm’s riskiness, while Proposition 6(a) states that the fraction of equity
retained by insiders is negatively related to the riskiness of the firm.
Garner and Marshall (2005) find that the proportion of firm value sold as
warrants is increasing in firm riskiness. My comparative measure is the value of the
warrants expressed as a percentage of gross proceeds. The value of the warrants as a
percentage of the gross proceeds (mean 13.12, median 9.97) is lower than the value of
the warrant(s) value expressed as a percentage of the unit offering of Garner and
Marshall. This, along with the proposition by Chemmanur and Fulgieri (1997), indicate
that SWORD offerings were less risky than the unit IPO sample of Garner and
Marshall. It is also consistently reported in the SEC filings that the parent company of
the SWORD and its officers hold an immaterial equity or interest position in the
SWORD. Then this, according to proposition 6(a), indicates that SWORD offerings
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were risky. The two findings contradict each other and do not allow me to make any
inferences from the warrants about the riskiness of the SWORD offering. This can be
attributed the type of offering. The majority of SWORD unit offerings are private. The
composition of unit offerings is also different. In a typical unit offering there are stock
and warrant(s) offering of the same company. In a SWORD offering the unit offering
is stock or partnership interests of one company (the SWORD) and warrants for
another (the parent company). Garner and Marshall also estimate the warrant values. I
use the warrant values assigned by the companies themselves in their ARS forms.
In panel B I report on the “moneyness” of the warrants at the final decision
time. Contrary to the “sweetener” explanation of the warrants, when I adjust for splits,
I find that the majority (52 percent) of the warrants are in the money continuously
during the 7 months surrounding and including the final decision month. If the
warrants are exercised at that time, they can provide part of the capital necessary for
the acquisition of the SWORD or finance other R&D projects, and this finding
supports the sequential investment problem hypothesis.
Additional support for the sequential financing hypothesis is provided in panel
C of table 21 where I examine the moneyness of the warrants in the 3 months including
the expiration month. The results show that 61 percent of the warrants were in the
money during the whole period of the 3 months.
Summarizing my empirical findings I find support for the earnings
management hypothesis, the separation of assets of different risk classes’ hypothesis,
and the sequential investment problem hypothesis. I fail to find support for the
information asymmetries hypothesis.
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Chapter 8. Summary and concluding remarks
This study explores the characteristics and motives of companies which form
SWORD structures to finance part of their R&D program. Stock and warrant offerings
for R&D (SWORD) are companies in the form of corporations R&D LP established, or
are sponsored by the parent company and set up as separate legal entities. Although
they appear independent, R&D LPs are controlled by the parent through the general
partner, a wholly owned subsidiary of the parent company and an SPE formed for the
sole purpose of serving as the general partner of the partnership. The mechanism of
controlling SWORD corporations is through a special class of limited number of shares
whose sole owner is the parent company and to which company these shares confer
certain rights that allow the parent company to control certain actions of the SWORD
corporation. A SWORD offering consists of stock or interests in the SWORD company
and warrants of the parent company. In exchange for the warrants and certain
proprietary assets, the parent company transfers or gives to the SWORD, the parent has
the right (a call option) but not the obligation to purchase the SWORD or buy and
license the technology developed on behalf of the SWORD.
The disappearance of the SWORD structures according to Schiff and Murray
can be explained by the intense negative publicity the class action lawsuit of Tocor II
investors against Centocor in 1993 received. Prior to the lawsuit, there was an implicit
understanding between the investors of the SWORD companies and the parent
companies that the SWORD structures will be purchased. When the parent companies
exercised their option not to purchase the SWORD structure or to acquire it through
tender offers at much lower prices SWORD structure fell out of favor with investors.
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I develop 5 testable hypotheses pertaining to the motives for forming SWORD
structures. The hypotheses are: (1) Earnings management hypothesis; (2) Debt
overhang/insurance hypothesis; (3) Separation of assets of different risk classes
hypothesis; (4) Information asymmetries hypothesis; and (5) Sequential investment
problem hypothesis.
I find that companies which form SWORD structures are small capitalization
firms mainly operating in science and technology industries. They are young, high
growth companies whose value is derived from their growth opportunities rather than
the assets in place. These companies exhibit similar leverage ratios to their industries
and control sample rejecting thus the debt overhang/debt insurance as a motive for
forming SWORD structures. They exhibit high cash burn ratios indicating the
continuous need for sources of new financing since they don’t generate enough
operating revenues to survive on their own. They show superior return performance to
their control sample in the years prior to the formation announcement. Their Z-scores
are very high, and their probability of bankruptcy is very low.
I find that the proceeds raised through the SWORD structures adjusted for
inflation are higher than the proceeds raised through stock and warrants or stock only
to finance R&D. Closer examination, however, reveals that companies which financed
R&D through SWORD structures were companies bigger in size than the companies
which used alternative financing mechanisms.
Short term event studies show a weak positive market reaction during the
announcement periods of the SWORD formation and non-reaction on the
announcement of the acquisitions. The same studies reveal that when the sample
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companies raised proceeds through issuance of their own equity, the market reaction
was strongly negative, and this may be a partial explanation for the motives of
choosing the SWORD financing mechanism vs. issuing equity of their own.
Different methodologies and sample selections give mixed results about the
long term pre-holding and post-holding period performances; therefore my results are
not robust to methodology and samples selected, and I cannot make any strong
inferences.
I find that the SWORD formation has a strong and positive impact on revenues,
net income and ultimately earnings per share in years 0, 1, and 2. The impact is still
positive for years 3, 4 and 5 although not statistically significant. This finding supports
the view that SWORD can be used to “beautify” the financial statements of the parent
company.
SWORD forming companies do not exhibit statistically significant higher
levels of information asymmetries than other control samples in years -1. Neither do
they reduce information asymmetries through the SWORD formation.
Although I do not detect shifts in the betas of the companies, I find that
companies which form SWORD companies have higher survival rates than their
matching sample. Companies increase their probability of survival by 23 percent when
they form their first SWORD. None of the companies with multiple SWORD
structures was delisted for any financial reason. The finding supports the assumption of
diversifying project specific risk which cannot be easily quantified through traditional
measurements of risk.
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Finally I find that SWORD structures are used as vehicles of sequential
financing. The findings are in agreement with the view that the warrants are used as a
signaling device to the market that the company does not have adverse information
about the R&D project, rather than as a sweetener. When I followed the staged scheme
and adjusted for splits, I find that the majority of the warrants are in the money at the
time of the acquisition and the expiration time.
In the annual report to shareholders and more specifically, in the financial
notes, the parent company reports all of its financial transactions with the SWORD
entity. Companies, contrary to popular belief, don’t “hide” their financial transactions
with the SWORD. They are also quite open about lawsuits filed against them by
providing the text of the lawsuit against them in their exhibits. This finding of my
dissertation has an important implication. Investors and financial analysts must pay
closer attention to the filings of the companies and how the numbers are calculated. If
the filings are followed closely, then experts can easily adjust the numbers to reflect
true risk, revenues, debt or EPS.
My study further supports the decision of SEC and other regulatory agencies to
apply stricter regulations rather than completely eliminating the SPE structures.
Although SPEs can be misused, I find that they also help small companies which
invest in R&D to survive. In addition they offer efficient solutions to financing projects
which require sequential investments.
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Figure 1. The corporation form of the SWORD financing arrangement
Parent company
SWORD Company
(SPE)
Investors
proprietary assets,
technology licences,
management
funds ($)
funds for R&D,
management fees,
options to purchase
shares, technology
callable common stock,
warrants
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parent company
R&D LP
investors
proprietary assets,
technology licenses,
royalties
funds ($)
funds for R&D,
options to purchase
partnership, license
technology
Partnership interests
warrants
wholly owned
subsidiary of parent
and general partner
of LP
management
services
management
fees ($)
Figure 2. The R&D LP form of the SWORD financing arrangemet
86
Table 1
Description of the sample research and development programs that were financed through the SWORD structure
The sample consists of 66 public announcements of formation of a ‘Stock and Warrant Offering for Research and Development’ (SWORD) structure.
All these SWORD formations were successfully (privately or publicly) issued in the U.S.A. These SWORD announcements were obtained through a
computer search of the Factiva-Dow Jones News Retrieval database over the period 1979 through 2004. This computer search identified only one
case of an unsuccessful SWORD units offering by Carrington Laboratories in 1992. All the announcements in the sample are non-contaminated and
they were made by 9 NYSE, 2 Amex, and 30 NASDAQ listed firms with sufficient data on CRSP. The actual duration of the SWORD entity is the
length of time (in months) from formation to date of actual exercise of the call option on the common stock of the SWORD entity. The duration till
the last call exercise date is the length of time (in months) from the formation date to the exercise date of the longest maturity call option on the
common stock of the SWORD entity. Six of the SWORD entities were terminated without being acquired. N.A. indicates that the date of the longest
maturity call option is not disclosed. CNT indicates that the longest call exercise date is set contingent upon certain future events. The research and
development (R&D) programs that are financed by the sample SWORD entities are classified into 3 phases based on the explanation/information
disclosed with the SWORD formation announcement/SEC filings. Phase 1 is the early (basic scientific) research phase. Phase 2 is the early
development phase (i.e., animal trials, for instance, in the case of a drug development). Phase 3 is the late development phase (i.e., human trials, for
instance, in the case of a drug development). ‘Several’ indicates that the SWORD structure finances several R&D programs at various phases (7. 58
percent), 4.55 percent of the sample SWORDs pertain to phase 1 only, 4.55 percent pertain to phase 2 only, 37.88 percent pertain to phase 3 only ,
12.12 percent pertain to phases 1 and 2 and 33.33 percent pertain to phases 2 and 3. At the bottom of the table descriptive statistics are reported for
the actual duration of the SWORD entity, the duration till last call exercise date, the matched gross and net proceeds, the flotation costs. The flotation
costs were calculated as 100*(gross proceeds – net proceeds) / gross proceeds. The cost of capital is based on what the research and development
company paid at the exercise time. The Black-Scholes (1973) formula for European call options was used to estimate the value of the outstanding
warrants. Following Yermack (1995), the 120, prior to the exercise date, logarithmic stock returns * 254 were used to estimate the annualized
volatility of the research and development company’s stock. The interest rates used in the calculation of the option value were obtained from the
Federal Bank of St. Louis and they were the U.S. treasury, constant maturity interest rates for the same time period as the remaining time to the
longest exercise date of the warrants. The value of the warrants was later included in the actual cost of capital. The tax savings are the amount of
taxes the research and development company saved when it expensed the acquisition cost. The annual cost was then estimated using the gross
proceeds at time 0, the year of the formation as present value, and the combined value of the warrants, the acquisition value and the tax savings as
future value. The tax savings were based on historical corporate tax rates found on the IRS web site. The other sources of information for this table
are the prospectuses, SEC filings and the Dow Jones articles.
87
Table 1 (continued)
Company forming
the SWORD
entity
Name of the
SWORD entity
Actual duration
of the SWORD
entity/outcome
Duration till
last call exercise
date
Gross (net)
proceeds of
offering in $
millions
Description and phase of R&D
financed by the SWORD structure R&D phase(s)
Alkermes Inc. Alkermes ClinicalPartners L.P. terminated CNT 46.0
Receptor mediated permeabilizers
molecules, which assist drugs in
entering the brain , RMP-7 later
known as Cereport ®
3
Alza Corp. Alza Oros Products L.P. 60.6 N.A. 30.0 (28.0)
Pseudoephedrine/brompheniramine
combination for treating symptoms
of the common cold, OROS
Chlorpheniramine, OROS
decongestant / antihistamine , OROS
potassium chloride
2 and 3
Alza Corp. Bio-Electro Systems Inc. 37.1 75.7 35.2 (33.5)
Bioerodible polymers and
electrotransport drug delivery
technologies
2 and 3
Amgen Corp. Amgen Clinical PartnersL. P. 68.45 CNT 84.0 (75.0)
Neupogen® and several
pharmaceutical products 2 and 3
B B N Inc. BBN AdvancedComputer Partners, L.P. 37.1 NA 32.4
Parallel-processing technology,
TC2000 parallel computer 3
B B N Inc BBN Integrated SwitchPartners, L.P 34.1 NA 10.0
Integrated private network products
incorporating packet switching and
circuit switching technology
3
B K W Inc Pulsenet L.P. noinformation N.A. 5.6
Pulsenet, a software product for
banks 3
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Table 1 (continued)
Becton Dickinson
& Co.
Becton Dickinson
Diagnostic Partners LP 62.3 N.A. 33.1
Cellular analysis immunodiagnostics
and microbiology 1 and 2
Bio-Technology
General Corp. Bio-Cardia Corp. terminated 47.9 37.5 (32.0)
Factorex, Bio-Lase and OxSODrol
CVD, Bio-Flow, an anti-reocclusion
agent, OxSODrol BPD, Imagex
2 and 3
Centocor Inc. Centocor Onco-geneResearch Partners L.P. 24.4 N.A. N.A Study of Oncogenes 1
Centocor Inc. Centocor CardiovascularImaging Partners L.P. 69.3 67.6 23.1
Myoscint, Fibriscint and diagnostic
tests for cardiovascular disease 2 and 3
Centocor Inc. Centocor Partners II L.P. 65.2 CNT 54.3 HA-1A, Centoxin, CentoRx, threecancer imaging products 2 and 3
Centocor Inc. Centocor Partners IIIL.P. 109.3 CNT 52.8
CentoRx, Capiscint, and 7E3 (phase
2, phase 3) 2 and 3
Centocor Inc. Tocor Inc. 22.2 64.6 (31.0)
Products being developed for
rheumatoid arthritis, multiple
sclerosis and lupus
1 and 2
Centocor Inc. Tocor II Inc. 25.8 47.5 (83.9) Small peptide molecule products fordisease treatment 1 and 2
Cephalon Inc. Cephalon ClinicalPartners L.P. Still exists CNT 45.0 (40.0)
Myotrophin, a drug to treat
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (Lou
Gehrig disease)
3
Cetus Corp. Cetus Healthcare LP I 41.7 N.A. 75.0
Proleukin Interleukin-2, Tumor
Necrosis Factor, Colony Stimulating
Factor-1, Immunotoxins for breast
and ovarian cancer, and monoclonal
antibodies
several
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Table 1 (continued)
Cetus Corp. Cetus Healthcare LP II 51.9 N.A. 62.0
TNF, M-CSF, and the immunotoxin
against ovarian cancer, Proleukin IL-
2, Proleukin PEG IL-2 and Macrolin
M-CSF
3
Clini-Therm Corp. Hyperthermia AssociatesLtd. 64.4 N.A. N.A
ARAs and adenosine for the
treatment of cardiovascular disorders
and ARAs for the treatment of
certain seizure disorders
2 and 3
Continental
Healthcare System
Inc.
Continental Healthcare
Mgmt Systems LTD
no
information N.A. 1.3 Software system 2
Cytogen Corp. Cytorad Inc. 35.1 58.6 40.3 (37.4)
OncoScint Prostate, OncoScint
Bladder, OncoRad Prostate,
OncoRad Bladder
2 and 3
Dura
Pharmaceuticals
Inc.
Dura Delivery Systems
Inc. 27.0 48.1 13.0
Dryhaler dry powder inhaler drug
delivery system, bitolterol,
ipratropium, triamcinolone,
cromolyn, flunisolide and
budesonide
2 and 3
Dura
Pharmaceuticals
Inc.
Spiros Development
Corp. 23.7 48.1 28.0
Spiros a drug delivery system and
drugs for use with Spiros, albuterol,
beclomethasone, budesonide and
salmon calcitonin
2 and 3
Dura
Pharmaceuticals
Inc.
Spiros Development
Corp. II 32.3 60.3 101.0(94.0)
Spiros and Spiros applications,
albuterol, beclomethasone,
budesonide and salmon calcitonin
3
Ecogen Inc. Ecogen Technologies IInc. 21.5 42.0 30.0
AQ10 Biofungicide, Aspire
Biofungicide, Condor® G
Bioinsecticide, and three other bio-
pesticides
2 and 3
Elan Corp. Drug Research Corp 29.6 61.5 43.2 (39.1)
IPDAS™ Technology, ETDAS™
Technology Panoderm™ ,
Panoject™
3
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Table 1 (continued)
Elan Corp. Advanced TherapeuticSystems Ltd. 38.0 56.5 78.5 (73.5)
Biodegradable Enhanced Oral,
Microparticle Injectable, and Electro
Transport Drug Administration
Systems, proton pump inhibitors,
potassium channel blocker drugs and
drugs for early stage treatment of
pain and cancer
several
Elan Corp. Axogen Ltd. 37.0 61.5 95.2 (89.0)
Antegren, Neurelan, Neurobloc,
Zanaflex SR, products for treating
neurological disorders, in particular
multiple sclerosis
3
Elan Corp. Neuralab Ltd. 24.5 47.5 50.0 (47.0) Therapeutic compounds for treatingAlzheimer's disease several
Endo-Lase Inc. Endo-Gyn Research andDevelopment L.P.
Endo-Lase is
liquidated N.A. (0.9)
Develop a procedure to replace
surgical hysterectomies in the
treatment of excessive menstrual
bleeding (Menhorragia)
3
G T I Corp. Electronic EquipmentDevelopment Ltd. 38.6 N.A. 1.2
Real-time three dimensional
computer graphics system, and a
non-magnetic handling system
3
Genentech Inc Genentech ClinicalPartners Ltd 50.1 N.A. 55.6
Protropin, a human growth hormone
and gamma interferon, Recombinant
t-PA
2 and 3
Genentech Inc Genentech ClinicalPartners II Ltd 42.0 N.A 34
Activase tissue plasminogen
activator (t-Pa) 3
Genentech Inc Genentech ClinicalPartners III Ltd 57.4 N.A. 30.7 Tumor Necrosis Factor 3
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Table 1 (continued)
Genentech Inc Genentech ClinicalPartners IV Ltd 40.0 N.A. 72.5
rCD4 and rCD4-IgG, potential aids
therapeutics (phase 3) 2 and 3
Genetics Institute
Inc. SciGenics Inc. 53.1 60.6 46.0 (42) Macstim™, rhM-CSF, EGRP 3
Genisco
Technology Corp SPACE Graph Ltd no information N.A. N.A
Three dimensional computer graphic
display systems 3
Genzyme Corp Genzyme ClinicalPartners L.P. 32.9 N.A. 10.0
Ceredase® glucoserebrosidace for
the treatment of Gaucher's desease 3
Genzyme Corp Genzyme DevelopmentPartners L.P. 136.1 CNT 36.8
HAL-C™, HAL-F™, HAL_F™,
HAL-G™, surgical products based
on hyaluronic acid,
Surgicoat,Flexicoat, Flexigel,
Synosol
2 and 3
Genzyme Corp Neozyme Corp. 26.0 50.6 47.4 (44.2)
Thyrogen™, Vianain™, CFTR,
diagnostic products for direct
cholesterol testing, synthetic
phospholipids, diagnostic products
for direct cholesterol testing,
synthetic phospholipids
several
Genzyme Corp Neozyme II Corp. 54.5 56.6 84.5 (78.0)
CFTR-PR, CFTR-PG, protein
replacement and gene therapy
products for the treatment of cystic
fibrosis
1
Hybritech Inc Hybritech ClinicalPartners Ltd
no
information N.A. 70.0 (63.0)
Monoclonal antibody related
products 2 and 3
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Table 1 (continued)
I C O S Corp I C O S Clinical PartnersL.P. still exists N.A. 87.5 (79.8) Hu23F2G, rPAF-AH and ICM3 3
Immunex Corp Receptech Corp 37.0 62.6 27.5 (25.0) IL-1, IL-4, IL-7, IL-8, TNF 2 and 3
International
Remote Imaging
Systems Inc
LDA Systems Corp. 32.0 37.5 (0.77) White IRIS leukocyte differential
analyzer
3
International
Remote Imaging
Systems Inc
Poly U/A Systems Inc 45.7 N.A. 2.6 (2.0) Automated urinalysis testingproducts several
K L A Instruments
Corp.
KLA Development No 1
LP no information N.A. (2.0)
Products that will automate certain
functions in the equipment of
semiconductor devices
3
K L A Instruments
Corp.
KLA Development No 2
LP
no
information N.A. (5.175)
A new image analysis system for the
manufacturing of large scale
integrated circuits
3
M G I
(Molecular
Genetics Inc)
Molecular Genetics
Research and
Development LP
liquidated N.A. 11.1 Vaccines for animals and improvedvarieties of corn 2 and 3
Paco
Pharmaceutical
Services Inc
Paco Development
Partners LP 38.0 N.A. 19.0 Health care products 1 and 2
Paco
Pharmaceutical
Services Inc
Paco Development
Partners II LP 51.0 37.5 25.0
Ophthalmic products and
transdermal delivery systems 1 and 2
Perseptive
Biosystems Inc
Perseptive Technologies
Corp 12.2 N.A. 10.0
Research and development of
technologies for use in clinical
applications and therapeutic drug
screening
1 and 2
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Table 1 (continued)
Perseptive
Biosystems Inc
Perseptive Technologies
II Corp 27.0 48.6 58.2 (53.2)
Clinical diagnostics and drug
screening technologies 1 and 2
Phoenix
Advanced
Technology Inc
Phoenix (Px) Advanced
Technology LP no information N.A. 0.7 Anti-inflammatory drugs 1 and 2
Repligen Corp Repligen Clinicalpartners L.P. terminated CNT 45.0 (40.3) Recombinant platelet factor-4 (rPF4) 3
Royce
Laboratories Inc
Royce Research and
Development LPI
Royce Inc is
acquired by
Watson Phar.
1996
N.A. 1.2 (1.0)
Alprazolam, Carisoprodol,
Captopril, Piroxicam, Pindolol,
Cyclobenzaprine, Hydrochloride,
Captopril (generic drugs)
3
S I C O R (former
Gensia)
Gencia Clinical Partners
Ltd terminated CNT 26.3 (23.0)
GenESA system that will aid in the
diagnosis of a coronary 2 and 3
S I C O R (former
Gensia) Aramed Inc. 47.1 48.6 57.5 (53)
2nd generation ARAs for
cardiovascular diseases, ARAs for
treatment of seizure disorders and
adenosine agonists
2
Scios Nova Inc.
(Nova Phar-
maceucals Inc)
Nova Technology L.P. 60.1 61.1 42.2(34.11)
Anti- inflammatory agents called
bradykinin antagonists,
GLIADEL®, SEPTACIN™
2 and 3
Storage
Technology Corp
Storage Technology
Partners L.P. terminated N.A. 50.0
High performance, IBM compatible,
main frame computers 3
Storage
Technology Corp
Storage Technology
Partners II L.P. terminated N.A. 40.0 Optical disk data storage device 3
Synergen Inc Synergen ClinicalPartners L.P. 46.45 CNT 52.5 (46.4)
ANTRIL™, Interleukin-1 receptor
antagonist called IL-1ra 2 and 3
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Table 1 (continued)
Syntex Corp Syntex Diagnostic L.P. terminated N.A. 23.5 Development of five diagnosticprojects 2 and 3
Ultimate Corp Ultimate DevelopmentPartners LTD no information N.A. 6.0
Two add-on products for mini-
computer systems 3
Ventrex
Laboratories Inc
Ventrex Technology
Partnership L.P. 35.5 N.A. 15.0
Study a biological response modifier
trade-named TSIF 2
Vipont Pharma-
ceutical Inc
Vipont Royalty Income
Fund LTD 97.6 N.A. 10.4
A new therapeutic drug for the
treatment of gum disease 1
Acquisition costs (%)
Reported statistics Actual duration ofthe SWORD
Duration till last
call exercise date
Matched gross
proceeds
Matched net
proceeds
Flotation costs
(%) APR EAR
Mean 45.7 54.4 50.2 45.72 10.16 26.48 46.67
Median 38.3 56.5 45.5 41.2 8.64 28.15 32.51
Max 136.1 75.7 101.0 94.0 23.08 136.34 290.95
Min 12.2 37.5 1.2 1.0 4.83 -52.89 -41.07
Std. Dev. 23.4 9.7 26.0 24.3 4.64 48.34 81.20
N 46 23 22 22 22 19 19
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Table 2
Chronological distribution and the method of issuance of the sample SWORD securities
Of the 66 sample cases, 20 were public offerings (i.e., the units were registered with SEC and listed on a
U.S. stock exchange) and 46 were private placements of SWORD units.
Announcement
year
Private
placements
Public
issues Total
Percent of
sample
1980 1 1 1.5
1981 3 1 4 6.1
1982 6 6 9.1
1983 7 7 10.6
1984 4 4 6.1
1985 2 2 3.0
1986 2 1 3 4.5
1987 5 1 6 9.1
1988 1 2 3 4.5
1989 2 2 4 6.1
1990 1 2 3 4.5
1991 2 4 6 9.1
1992 4 2 6 9.1
1993 2 2 4 6.1
1994 1 1 1.5
1995 1 1 2 3.0
1996 1 1 1.5
1997 1 1 2 3.0
1998 1 1 1.5
Total 46 20 66 100.0
Percent of sample 69.70 30.30 100
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Table 3
Industry classification of the SWORD sample by the 1987 SIC code
Four-
digit
SIC code
Industry Privateplacements
Public
issues Total Percent
2834 Pharmaceutical preparations 16 7 23 34.8
2835 In vitro and in vivo diagnostic substances 2 1 3 4.5
2836 Biological products, except diagnostic substances 10 7 17 25.8
2844 Perfumes, cosmetics, and other toilet preparations 1 1 1.5
2870 Agricultural chemicals 1 1 1.5
3571 Electronic computers 1 1 1.5
3572 Computer storage devices 2 2 3.0
3575 Computer terminals 1 1 1.5
3600 Electronic and other except computers 1 1 1.5
3679 Electronic components not elsewhere classified 1 1 1.5
3826 Laboratory analytical instruments 1 3 4 6.1
3827 Optical instruments and lenses 2 2 3.0
3841 Surgical and medical instruments and apparatus 1 1 1.5
3845 Electromedical and electrotherapeutic apparatus 1 1 1.5
5047 Medical, dental and hospital equipment supplies 1 1 1.5
7373 Computer integrated systems design 4 4 6.1
7389 Business services not elsewhere classified 2 2 3.0
Total 46 20 66 100.0
Percent of sample 69.70 30.30 100
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Table 4
Descriptive statistics of the research and development companies forming SWORD entities
Appurtenance of an event firm to a CRSP market capitalization decile is determined based on data at the end of the calendar-year prior to the
announcement. CRSP decile 1 includes firms with the smallest market capitalization. The ratio of market-to-book-value of equity for an event firm is
calculated as market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at the end of the fiscal year prior to the event the ratio was not calculated for
companies with negative book value of equity). Similar to Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Lamont et al. (2001), the Q-ratio for an event firm is
calculated as [total assets + market value of equity – total book value of common equity – deferred taxes] / total assets. The ratios of R&D-
expenditures-to-sales or to-market-value-of-equity are computed at the end of the fiscal year prior to the event date. Financial leverage 1 = [long-term
debt / market value of equity]. Financial leverage 2 = [(long-term debt + short term debt) / market value of equity]. Financial leverage 3 = [(long-
term debt / total assets]. Financial leverage 4 = [(long-term debt + short term debt) / total assets]. All four debt ratios are computed at the end of the
fiscal year prior to the event date. Operating income is earnings before interest and taxes plus depreciation and amortization charges. Cash-burnout
rate 1 = [cash at year -1 / R&D expenditures in year 0]. Cash-burnout rate 2 = [cash at year -1 / interest expense in year 0]. Cash-burnout rate 3 =
[cash at year -1 / (R&D expense in year 0 + interest expense in year 0)]. Cash-burnout rate 4 = [cash at year -1 / (R&D expenditures in year 0 +
interest expense in year 0 + current liabilities in year -1)]. Operating income is earnings before interest taxes + depreciation. Altman’s (1968) z-score
= 3.3*[earnings before interest and taxes / total assets] + 0.999*[sales / total assets] + 0.6* [market value of equity / total liabilities] + 1.2*[working
capital / total assets] + 1.4*[retained earnings / total assets]. The stock returns are calculated at the end of the calendar year.
Full sample
(n = 66)
First SWORDs
(n = 41)
Follow up
SWORDs (n = 25)
Privately placed
SWORDs
(n = 46)
Publicly issued
SWORDs
(n = 20)
Mean (n) Median Mean(n) Median Mean(n) Median Mean(n) Median Mean(n) Median
Number of years since first exchange-listed 5.80 (66) 4.66 5.38 (41) 2.61 6.50 (25) 5.35 5.01 (46) 2.68 7.62 (20) 5.99
CRSP market capitalization decile 7.52 (58) 8.00 7.00 (36) 7.00 8.36 (22) 9.00 7.50 (40) 8.00 7.56 (18) 8.00
Ratio of market-to-book-value of equity 5.98 (57) 3.69 7.17 (35) 3.63 4.08 (22) 4.10 6.89 (39) 3.75 3.99 (18) 3.56
Q-ratio 3.45 (55) 3.10 3.49 (33) 3.22 3.39 (22) 3.06 3.51 (37) 3.13 3.45 (18) 3.16
R&D Expenditures / sales (%) 167.24 (54) 35.76 233.21 (36) 40.19 35.30 (18) 33.73 203.21 (38) 43.57 81.81 (16) 21.55
R&D Expenditures / market value of equity
(%) 5.35 (52) 4.89 5.25 (33) 5.00 5.54 (19) 3.41 5.28 (35) 5.08 5.51 (17) 3.41
Financial leverage 1 (%) 5.88 (57) 1.30 6.16 (35) 1.30 5.44 (22) 1.30 5.48 (39) 1.30 6.76 (18) 2.31
Financial leverage 2 (%) 7.08 (57) 1.74 7.79 (35) 1.74 5.94 (22) 1.80 6.86 (39) 1.74 7.56 (18) 2.66
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Financial leverage 3 (%) 9.91 (62) 4.62 9.34 (40) 4.19 10.95 (22) 4.66 9.12 (44) 4.59 11.85 (18) 5.08
Financial leverage 4 (%) 13.58 (62) 6.86 14.45 (40) 7.21 12.00(22) 6.52 13.70 (44) 6.86 13.29 (18) 6.57
Operating income in year -2 ($ millions) 11.95 (57) -0.09 8.21 (35) -0.50 17.90 (22) 2.54 15.32 (39) -0.09 4.64 (18) 0.72
Operating income in year -1 ($ millions) 13.99 (62) 0.18 7.95 (40) -0.60 24.98 (22) 5.22 17.49 (44) -0.33 5.46 (18) 0.38
Net income at end of year -2 ($ millions) 3.31 (57) 0.12 1.87 (35) -0.45 5.61 (22) 0.96 4.36 (39) 0.24 1.03 (18) -0.03
Net income at end of year -1 ($ millions) 5.41 (62) 0.75 1.98 (40) -0.36 11.66 (22) 3.56 8.26 (44) 0.67 -1.54 (18) 1.00
Operating income in year -1 to total assets -4.01 (62) 0.72 -8.50 (40) -6.89 4.15 (22) 6.52 -4.42 (44) -0.99 -3.01 (18) 3.29
Net income at year -1 to market value of
equity -0.68 (57) 1.18 -1.28 (35) 0.17 0.27 (22) 1.72 -0.46 (39) 1.08 -1.16 (18) 1.28
Cash burnout rate 1 (years) 2.45 (56) 1.51 2.37 (37) 1.51 2.60 (19) 1.45 2.05 (39) 1.48 3.35 (17) 2.21
Cash burnout rate 2 (years) 81.93 (49) 28.92 87.05 (30) 18.97 73.85 (19) 36.37 63.17 (32) 23.53 117.23 (17) 28.97
Cash burnout rate 3(years) 3.30 (51) 2.48 2.72 (32) 1.72 4.28 (19) 3.60 2.72 (34) 1.58 4.45 (17) 3.66
Cash burnout rate 4 (years) 1.31 (51) 0.91 1.17 (32) 0.94 1.53 (19) 0.78 1.07 (34) 0.78 1.78 (17) 1.29
Z-score at end of year -2 21.93 (45) 21.33 22.50 (26) 14.76 21.15 (19) 23.29 23.00 (29) 23.12 19.99 (16) 16.46
Z-score at end of year -1 23.60 (57) 16.79 25.27 (35) 14.11 20.94 (22) 21.15 25.61 (39) 14.11 19.26 (18) 18.48
Stock return over year -2 60.00 (43) 26.56 85.99 (21) 68.45 35.18 (22) -5.26 41.13 (25) -8.61 86.18 (18) 70.37
Stock return over year -1 38.27 (47) 20.15 38.28 (24) 7.35 35.77 (23) 36.49 33.58 (29) 11.31 42.65 (18) 36.95
99
Table 5.a
The SWORD forming companies and their R&D intensity matching sample
The matching criteria are the industry classification code (SIC COMPUSTAT code) and the ratio research and development to sales at the end of the
fiscal year prior to the announcement year. If there was no match available in the same 3-digit industry code and within ±25 percent of the R&D
intensity ratio of the SWORD forming company then the search was extended to the same 3- digit industry code companies.
Matching
Year
Company forming
the SWORD entity SIC code
R&D
to Sales Matching Company SIC Code R&D/ sales
1991 Alkermes Inc 2834 3184.10 Indevus Pharmaceuticals Inc 2834 3483.30
1982 Alza Corp. 2834 41.22 Polydex Chemicals Canada Ltd 2834 44.72
1987 Alza Corp. 2834 36.92 Oxis International Inc 2835 38.33
1986 Amgen Inc. 2836 39.15 Pharmaceutical Formulations 2834 45.03
1986 B B N (Bolt Beranek & Newman Inc) 7373 4.85 Recognition Intl Inc 7373 4.80
1983 B K W Inc. 7373 22.51 Mtx International Inc 7373 22.64
1982 Becton Dickinson & Co. 3841 4.43 Stryker Corp 3842 4.10
1993 Bio-Technology General Corp. 2836 104.18 Ostex International Inc 2835 102.11
1982 Centocor Inc. 2836 156.56 Biogen Inc 2836 151.73
1984 Centocor Inc. 2836 61.75 Unimed Pharmaceuticals Inc 2834 64.41
1985 Centocor Inc. 2836 45.91 Pharmaceutical Formulations 2834 40.87
1987 Centocor Inc. 2836 53.67 Gynex Pharmaceuticals 2834 53.68
1988 Centocor Inc. 2836 61.27 Probac Intl Corp 2836 63.64
1990 Centocor Inc. 2836 32.86 Carrington Labs 2834 31.49
1991 Cephalon Inc. 2834 153.08 Chemtrak Inc 2835 152.84
1982 Cetus Corp. 2836 94.24 Interpharm Labs Ltd -Ord 2833 76.73
1985 Cetus Corp. 2836 16.17 Biosource International Inc 2835 16.09
1982 Clini-Therm Corp. 3845 676.67 Luther Medical Prodcts 3841 575.00
1983 Continental Healthcare System Inc. 3571 3.40 Compaq Computer Corp 3571 3.35
1990 Cytogen Corp. 2835 791.32 Unigene Laboratories Inc 2833 811.11
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1992 Dura Pharmaceuticals Inc. 2834 0.00 Millennium Biotech Group Inc 2834 0.00
1992 Ecogen Inc. 2870 51.40 Biosys Inc 2870 56.04
1989 Elan Corp. 2834 12.27 Vitro Diagnostics Inc 2834 12.12
1992 Elan Corp. 2834 12.70 Rhone-Poulenc Rorer 2834 12.73
1995 Elan Corp. 2834 14.34 Pfizer Inc 2834 14.39
1997 Elan Corp. 2834 17.95 Pharmacia & Upjohn Inc 2834 18.14
1979 G T I Corp. 3679 0.96 Corcom Inc 3679 0.91
1981 Genentech Inc. 2834 110.05 Pro-Scan Inc 2834 100.00
1982 Genentech Inc. 2834 90.97 Interpharm Labs Ltd -Ord 2833 76.73
1983 Genentech Inc. 2834 86.53 Quidel Corp 2835 85.80
1988 Genentech Inc. 2834 34.60 Immunomedics Inc 2835 33.33
1990 Genetics Institute Inc. 2836 112.46 Nastech Pharmaceutical 2834 110.20
1980 Genisco Technology Corp 3575 5.79 Qantel Corp 3571 5.79
1982 Hybritech Inc 2835 271.03 Wildlife Vaccines Inc 2836 300.00
1996 I C O S Corp 2834 1500.60 Sciclone Pharmaceuticals Inc 2834 1414.30
1988 Immunex Corp 2836 26.93 Chiral Quest Inc 2836 28.57
1991 International Remote Imaging Systems Inc 3826 9.56 Isco Inc 3823 9.55
1994 International Remote Imaging Systems Inc 3826 4.02 Stimsonite Corp 3827 4.06
1980 K L A Instruments Corporation 3827 10.44 Transcat Inc 3825 10.17
1981 K L A Instruments Corporation 3827 8.03 Keithley Instr Inc 3825 7.67
1981 M G I Pharma Inc 2834 393.91 Wildlife Vaccines Inc 2836 200.00
1991 Perseptive Biosystems Inc 3826 229.89 Phoenix Laser Sys Inc 3845 234.95
1992 Perseptive Biosystems Inc 3826 46.39 Strategic Diagnostics Inc 3829 55.88
1991 Repligen Corp 2836 158.12 Telios Pharmaceuticals Inc 2834 157.42
1990 Royce Laboratories Inc 2834 8.74 Bristol Myers Squibb 2834 8.55
1987 Scios Nova Inc. 2834 117.50 Spectra Pharmaceutical Svcs 2834 121.62
1980 Storage Technology Corp 3572 6.51 Onyx Imi Ltd 3571 6.49
1989 Synergen Inc 2834 46.16 Invitron Corp 2836 48.26
1981 Syntex Corp 2834 9.22 Pharmacia & Upjohn Inc 2834 9.02
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1981 Ultimate Corp 7373 4.13 Dyatron Corp 7370 4.14
1981 Ventrex Laboratories Inc 2835 25.68 Clinical Sciences Inc 2835 25.21
1986 Vipont Pharmaceutical Inc 2844 8.51 Qmax Technology Group Inc 2844 7.40
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Table 5.b
Industry and R&D intensity adjusted descriptive statistics of the research and development companies forming SWORD entities
The ratio R&D expenditures to sales in year -1 relative to the announcement year were calculated for every research and development company that
formed a SWORD entity. For every company, the same ratio was calculated for all companies that operated in the same 3-digit industry in year -1.
The company with the closest R&D expenditures / sales ratio (±25%) was chosen as the matching firm. If there was no match within the ±25% range
then the same procedure was repeated for all companies that operated in the same 2-digit industry as the research and development company in year -
1. To obtain the industry and R&D intensity adjusted ratios, for each ratio of the research and development company the same ratio of the matching
firm was subtracted. The following 2 null hypotheses were tested. i) The mean industry and R&D intensity adjusted ratio is 0 and ii) the median
industry and R&D intensity adjusted ratio is 0. The reported test statistics are the t value for the mean, and the Wilcoxon signed rank value.
Full sample First SWORDs Follow up SWORDs Privately placedSWORDs
Publicly issued
SWORDs
Mean (n) Median Mean(n) Median Mean(n) Median Mean(n) Median Mean(n) Median
R&D Expenditures / sales 1.01 (54)(0.14)
0.05
(0.76)
1.32 (36)
(0.12)
0.05
(0.72)
0.38 (18)
(0.37)
0.01
(0.17)
2.32 (38)
(0.23)
1.61
(0.11)
-2.12 (16)
(-1.56)
-0.03
(1.22)
R&D Expenditures / market value of equity -2.22 (38)(-1.48)
-0.10
(1.03)
-2.11 (23)
(-1.19)
0.06
(0.35)
-2.38 (15)
(-0.87)
-2.30
(0.88)
-2.57 (24)
(-1.29)
0.02
(0.53)
-1.62 (14)
(-0.70)
-0.97
(1.07)
Financial leverage 1 -3.64 (38)(-1.01)
0.25
(0.35)
-5.50 (23)
(-0.98)
0.00
(0.52)
-0.79 (15)
(-0.25)
1.67
(1.44)
-8.17 (24)
( -1.57)
0.03
(0.52)
4.1 (14)
(1.26)
2.20
(1.47)
Financial leverage 2 -6.94 (38)(-1.10)
0.00
(0.48)
-9.96 (23)
(-0.97)
-0.16
(0.59)
-2.30 (15)
(-0.67)
0.42
(0.25)
-13.17
(24)
(-1.36)
-0.24
(1.27)
3.74 (14)
(1.06)
0.95
(0.12)
Financial leverage 3 0.06 (54)(0.02)
1.13
(0.86)
-1.76 (36)
(-0.44)
0.22
(0.25)
-2.11 (18)
(-0.54)
0.51
(0.33)
9.67 (28)
(1.16)
-0.65
(0.10)
3.25 (16)
(0.28)
0.52
(0.77)
Financial leverage 4 -3.74 (54)(-0.94)
0.00
(0.70)
-4.55 (36)
(-0.80)
0.00
(0.57)
-2.11 (18)
(-0.54)
0.33
(0.11)
-3.94 (38)
(-0.82)
-3.61
(1.45)
-3.79 (16)
(-0.56)
0.70
(0.03)
Operating income in year -1 to total assets 33.66
a (54)
(4.69)
16.39 a
(4.58)
38.63 a (36)
(3.93)
17.11 a
(3.75)
23.73 b (18)
(2.75)
14.55 b
(2.70)
27.07a
(38)
(4.06)
16.39a
(4.12)
49.32b(16)
(2.72)
12.24c
(1.99)
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Net income at year -1 to market value of
equity
12.12 a (38)
(3.15)
3.10 a
(3.23)
10.74 a (23)
(3.21)
4.73 b
(2.75)
14.23 (15)
(1.68)
2.77
(1.62)
9.94b (24)
(2.98)
4.06b
(2.73)
15.84 (14)
(1.78)
1.90
(1.51)
Stock return over year -2 23.27 (22)(1.29)
33.38
(1.40)
53.02c (11)
(2.20)
41.35
(1.82)
-6.47 (11)
(-0.26)
-24.07
(0.04)
2.53 (13)
(0.92)
0.60
(0.21)
53.24 (9)
(2.00)
46.67
(1.66)
Stock return over year -1 41.99
b (28)
(2.67)
29.82 b
(2.74)
27.16 (15)
(1.22)
5.66
(1.11)
59.09 b (13)
(2.69)
38.84 b
(2.80)
32.18
(16)
(2.05)
15.35
(1.94)
55.07 (12)
(1.80)
47.38
(1.12)
The symbols a, b, c are used to denote statistical significance at .01, .05 and .1 respectively.
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Table 6.a
Industry mean adjusted descriptive statistics of the research and development companies forming SWORD entities
For every company that formed a SWORD entity and for each one of its ratios the same ratio was calculated for all companies that operated in the
same 4-digit industry code in year -1 relative to the announcement year and the mean and median values were obtained for the industry. If the
number of non-event firms was less than 3, then the same procedure was repeated for all companies that operated in year -1 in the same 3-digit
industry. For every company and for each one of its ratios, the industry adjusted ratios were computed by subtracting from the ratio of the company
that formed a SWORD entity in year -1 the same mean ratio of the industry. The following 2 null hypotheses were tested. i) The mean industry and
R&D intensity adjusted ratio is 0 and ii) the median industry and R&D intensity adjusted ratio is 0. The reported test statistics are the t value for the
mean, and the Wilcoxon signed rank value for the median.
Full sample FirstSWORDs
Follow up
SWORDs
Privately placed
SWORDs
Publicly issued
SWORDs
Mean (n) Median Mean(n) Median Mean(n) Median Mean(n) Median Mean(n) Median
R&D Expenditures / sales -160.08
c(54)
(-1.77)
-85.16 a
(3.39)
-81.44 (36)
(-0.64)
-36.11 c
(1.85)
-317.37 a (18)
(-3.86)
-174.52 a
(3.87)
-108.41 (38)
(-0.89)
-19.25c
(2.03)
-282.80b(16)
(-2.90)
-174.32b
(2.71)
R&D Expenditures /
market value of equity
-2.29 a (52)
(-3.70)
-1.82 a
(3.40)
-2.02 a (33)
(-3.25)
-1.74 a
(2.80)
-2.76 b (19)
(-2.08)
2.82 c
(1.95)
-1.68b (35)
(-2.57)
-0.95c
(2.10)
-3.56b (17)
(-2.71)
-3.85b
(2.56)
Financial leverage 1 -11.55
a(57)
(-4.81)
-9.01 a
(4.94)
-14.15 a(35)
(-3.84)
29.40 a
(3.86)
-7.41a (22)
(-4.02)
-7.75 a
(3.05)
-13.47a (39)
(-4.32)
-11.03a
(4.35)
-7.39c (18)
(-2.18)
-7.88b
(2.41)
Financial leverage 2 -19.21
a(57)
(-5.87)
15.22 a
(-5.56)
-22.39 a (35)
(-4.44)
-16.41 a
(4.27)
-14.16 a(22)
(-5.52)
-12.63 a
(3.67)
-21.05a (39)
(-4.84)
-17.73a
(-4.72)
-15.25a (18)
(-3.51)
-14.84a
(2.87)
Financial leverage 3 -8.73
a (62)
(-3.04)
-8.13
(3.20)
-9.90b (40)
(-2.44)
-7.84b
(2.71)
-6.60 (22)
(-1.97)
-8.76
(1.69)
-10.35c (44)
(-2.76)
-7.81 a
(2.83)
-4.77 (18)
(-1.31)
-10.34
(1.31)
Financial leverage 4 -17.28
a (62)
(-5.26)
-16.46
(5.15)
-16.97 a (40)
(-3.65)
-15.88
(3.86)
-17.84a (22)
(-4.57)
-18.25a
(3.41)
-15.96 a (44)
(-3.75)
-15.18 a
(3.97)
-20.49 a (18)
(4.51)
-20.22
(3.27)
Operating income in year
-1 to total assets
22.14 a (62)
(4.35)
22.07 a
(4.07)
12.93 b (40)
(1.97)
9.40 c
(1.81)
38.89 a (22)
(5.72)
35.44 a
(3.90)
12.22b (44)
(2.65)
11.99b
(2.49)
46.40a (18)
(3.93)
35.46a
(3.31)
Net income at year -1 to
market value of equity
10.59 a (57)
(3.65)
7.61 a
(5.19)
12.25 a (35)
(2.65)
7.54 a
(3.89)
7.94 a (22)
(4.92)
9.64 a
(3.47)
11.11b (39)
(2.66)
7.54a
(3.83)
9.44a (18)
(5.19)
9.21a
(3.53)
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Stock return over year -2 38.94
b (43)
(1.96)
10.00 c
(1.78)
55.95 (21)
(1.72)
39.25 c
(1.88)
22.69 (22)
(0.95)
-0.24
(0.32)
18.70 (25)
(0.67)
2.36
(0.05)
67.04b (18)
(2.47)
40.52b
(2.66)
Stock return over year -1 -0.72 (47)(-0.06)
-3.50
(0.20)
-0.59 (24)
(-0.03)
-8.19
(0.13)
-0.87 (23)
(-0.08)
-3.51
(0.11)
-1.64 (29)
(-0.10)
2.84
(0.26)
0.75 (18)
(0.05)
-16.15
(0.00)
The symbols a, b, c are used to denote statistical significance at .01, .05 and .1 respectively
Table 6.b
Industry median adjusted descriptive statistics of the research and development companies forming SWORD entities
For every company that formed a SWORD entity and for each one of its ratios the same ratio was calculated for all companies that operated in the
same 4-digit industry code in year -1 relative to the announcement year and the mean and median values were obtained for the industry. If the
number of non-event firms was less than 3, then the same procedure was repeated for all companies that operated in year -1 in the same 3-digit
industry. For every company and for each one of its ratios, the industry adjusted ratios were computed by subtracting from the ratio of the company
that formed a SWORD entity in year -1 the same median ratio of the industry. The following 2 null hypotheses were tested. i) The median industry
and R&D intensity adjusted ratio is 0 and ii) the median industry and R&D intensity adjusted ratio is 0. The reported test statistics are the t value for
the mean, and the Wilcoxon signed rank value for the median.
Full sample First SWORDs Follow upSWORDs
Privately placed
SWORDs
Publicly issued
SWORDs
Mean (n) Median Mean(n) Median Mean(n) Median Mean(n) Median Mean(n) Median
R&D Expenditures / sales 130.37 (54)(1.95)
1.47
(1.69)
199.70b (36)
(2.03)
11.29a
(2.62)
-8.30 (18)
(-0.73)
-5.54
(0.87)
166.60(38)
(1.81)
6.52
(1.93)
44.31 (16)
(0.89)
-0.14
(0.80)
R&D Expenditures / market value of equity 0.90 (52)(1.71)
0.59
(1.26)
1.14 b (33)
(2.34)
0.83 c
(1.82)
0.49 (19)
(0.41)
-1.54
(0.06)
1.25c (35)
(2.30)
1.21
(1.89)
0.18 (17)
(0.15)
0.23
(0.38)
Financial leverage 1 2.09 (57)(1.53)
-0.23
(0.29)
1.77 (35)
(0.19)
-0.21
(0.14)
2.60 (22)
(1.44)
-0.46
(0.84)
1.49 (39)
(0.92)
-0.21
(0.10)
3.39 (18)
(1.30)
-0.80
(0.91)
Financial leverage 2 -0.65 (57)(-0.37)
1.70
(1.64)
-1.27 (35)
(-0.50)
-2.10
(1.66)
0.33 (22)
(0.16)
-1.07
(0.62)
-1.21 (39)
(-0.56)
-1.29
(1.81)
0.56 (18)
(0.18)
-2.02
(0.48)
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Financial leverage 3 3.32
c (62)
2.16
-0.64
(0.73)
2.40 (40)
(1.27)
-0.64
(0.29)
5.00 (22)
(1.89)
-0.78
(0.65)
2.04 (44)
(1.24)
-0.64
(0.04)
6.47 (18)
(1.90)
0.64
(1.39)
Financial leverage 4 -0.32 (62)(-0.14)
-6.44
(0.86)
0.10 (40)
(0.03)
-5.72
(0.81)
-1.07 (22)
(-0.37)
-6.83
(0.26)
-0.39 (44)
-0.14)
-5.72
(0.93)
-0.12 (18)
(-0.03)
-7.12
(0.22)
Operating income in year -1 to total assets -3.26 (62)(-1.04)
4.06
(0.00)
-9.96b (40)
(-2.46)
-1.50
(1.53)
8.92 b (22)
(2.35)
13.05 b
(2.11)
-5.83 (44)
(-1.52)
3.01
(0.54)
3.03 (18)
(0.58)
9.34
(0.70)
Net income at year -1 to market value of
equity
-0.79 (57)
(-0.80)
-0.01
(0.12)
-2.08 (35)
(-1.64)
-1.28
(1.19)
1.26 (22)
(0.84)
4.03
(1.07)
-1.18 (39)
(-0.96)
-0.60
(0.55)
0.07 (18)
(0.04)
1.64
(0.39)
Stock return over year -2 57.43
a (43)
(3.08)
24.96a
(3.22)
77.09b (21)
(2.59)
54.10b
(2.75)
38.67 (22)
(1.70)
12.30
(1.60)
36.68 (25)
(1.43)
-1.36
(1.00)
86.26a(18)
(3.33)
70.81
(3.35)
Stock return over year -1 24.93
b (47)
(2.64)
12.06c
(2.09)
28.14c (24)
(1.72)
6.31
(1.10)
21.59c (23)
(2.30)
13.98b
(1.96)
22.29 (29)
(1.71)
11.26
(1.32)
29.29c(18)
(2.21)
22.09
(1.70)
The symbols a, b, c are used to denote statistical significance at .01, .05 and .1 respectively
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Table 7
Description of the sample research and development programs that were financed through the
offering/placement of common stock and warrants
The sample consists of 38 public announcements of common stock shares and warrant
offerings/placements to finance research and development programs. All these issues were successfully
(privately or publicly) issued in the U.S.A. These offering or placement announcements were obtained
through a computer search of the Factiva-Dow Jones News Retrieval and the LEXIS NEXIS Newswires
databases over the period 1979 through 2004. All the announcements in the sample are non-
contaminated and they were made by 1 NYSE, 11 Amex, and 26 Nasdaq listed firms with sufficient data
on CRSP. Information about the net proceeds of the offerings/placements was obtained through the SEC
filings of the companies which are available through LEXIS NEXIS.
Company issuing stock
and warrants to finance
research and
development programs
Gross (net)
proceeds of
offering in $
millions
Description and phase of R&D
financed by the SWORD structure
Access Pharmaceuticals
Inc 9.7 (9.1) Several products (all phases)
Avanir Pharmaceuticals 10 (9.4) Neurodex (phase 3)
Biomira Inc 10 BLP25 Liposome Vaccine (L-BLP25) (phase 3)
Clini Therm Corp 5 Several products (all phases)
Corautus Genetics Inc 2.25 VEGF-2 (phase 3)
Cortex Pharmaceuticals
Inc 5 (4.5) AMPAKINE ® compounds (phase 3)
Cortex Pharmaceuticals
Inc 19 (17.5) AMPAKINE ® compounds (phase 3)
Cortex Pharmaceuticals
Inc 11.26 (10.385)
CX717 and a chemical compound to elevate BDNF (phase
3)
Cubist Pharmaceuticals
Inc 13.7 (12.7) Daptomycin, VITA™ (phase 3)
Curis Inc 10.9 (9.805) Several products (all phases)
Delcath Systems Inc 2.1 Delcath system (phase 3)
Depomed Inc 5 (4.762) Gastric Retention System (GR) (phase 3)
Depomed Inc 20 (18.668) Metformin GR™, Ciproflaxacin GR (phase 3)
Discovery Laboratories
Inc 2.45 Surfaxin® (phase 3)
Discovery Laboratories
Inc 18.5 (17.5) Surfaxin® (phase 3)
Energy Biosystems
Corp 7.1 (6.8) Biocatalytic desulfurization technology (phase 3)
Entremed Inc 30.1 (28.4) Angiogenesis inhibitors (phase 3)
Generex Biotechnology
Corp Del 23
Development of oral drug delivery delivery technology for
large molecule drugs (phase 3)
Generex Biotechnology
Corp Del 3.365 (3.1) Oralin ™ (phase 3)
108
Table 7 (continued)
Genta Inc 11.4 (10.4) Anticode™ products (phase 3)
Genome Therapeutics
Corp 9.55 (9) Ramoplanin (phase 3)
Guilford
Pharmaceuticals Inc 27.4 (25.8)
PercutaneousCoronary Intervention (PCI) and AQUAVAN
®, (phase 3)
Inkine Pharmaceutical
Inc 10.8 (9.9) CBP-1011, IdiopathicThrompocytopenic Purpura (phase 3)
Keryx
Biopharmaceuticals Inc 15 KRX-101 (phase 3)
Lynx Therapeutics Inc 4 (3.8) Massive Parallel Signature Sequencing (MPSS™) (phase 3)
Macrochem Corp 10.1 (9.406) Topiglan® (phase 3)
Neotherapeutics Inc 4 NEOTROFIN™ (AIT_082, leteprinin potassium) (phase 3)
Neotherapeutics Inc 8 NEOTROFIN™ (AIT_082, leteprinin potassium) (phase 3)
Neotherapeutics Inc 5.15 NEOTROFIN™ (AIT_082, leteprinin potassium),Satraplatin (phase 3)
Neotherapeutics Inc 0.938 Neoquin™, Elsamitrucin™ (phase 3)
Nymox Pharmaceutical
Corp 4 Several products (phase 2 and phase 3)
Palatin Technologies
Inc 2.607 (2.35) Leutech™ (phase 3)
Palatin Technologies
Inc 4.2 Leutech™, PT-141 (phase 3)
Palatin Technologies
Inc 11.5
Leutech®, PT-141 and the first product from MIDAS™
technology (phase 3)
Procept Inc 10 Several products (all phases)
Ribozyme
Pharmaceuticals Inc 48 RNA interference (RNAi) (phase 2)
Spectrum
Pharmaceuticals Inc 0.5985 Neoquin™, Elsamitrucin™ (phase 3)
Tyler Technologies Inc 10 (9.27) E-government initiatives and Nationsdata.com (phase 3)
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Table 8
Chronological distribution and the method of issuance of the offering or/placement of common
stock and warrants sample to finance R&D programs
Of the 38 stock and warrant offerings/placements 2 were public offerings (i.e., the common shares and
the warrants were registered with SEC and listed on a U.S. stock exchange) and 36 were private
placements.
Announcement
year
Private
placements
Public
issues Total
Percent of
sample
1983 1 1 2.63
1997 1 1 2.63
1998 1 1 2.63
1999 6 6 15.79
2000 7 7 18.42
2001 1 1 2.63
2002 5 1 6 15.79
2003 9 9 23.68
2004 5 1 6 15.79
Total 36 2 38 100.00
Percent of sample 94.74 5.26 100
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Table 9
Industry classification of the common stock and warrants offerings/placements sample by the 1987
SIC code
Four-
digit
SIC
code
Industry Privateplacements
Public
issues Total Percent
2834 Pharmaceutical preparations 18 47.37
2835 In vitro and in vivo diagnostic substances 5 13.16
2836 Biological products, except diagnostic substances 10 1 28.95
3841 Surgical and medical instruments and apparatus 1 1 5.26
7373 Computer integrated systems design 1 2.63
8731 Services-Commercial Physical & Biological Research 1 2.63
Total 36 2 38 100.00
Percent of sample 94.74 5.26 100
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Table 10
Description of the sample research and development programs which were financed through the
offering/placement of common stock
The sample consists of 33 public announcements of common stock offerings/placements to finance
research and development programs. All these issues were successfully (privately or publicly) issued in
the U.S.A. These offering/placement announcements were obtained through a computer search of the
Factiva-Dow Jones News Retrieval and the LEXIS NEXIS Newswires databases over the period 1979
through 2004. All the announcements in the sample are non-contaminated and they were made by 2
Amex, and 31 Nasdaq listed firms with sufficient data on CRSP. Information about the net proceeds of
the offerings/placements was obtained from the SEC filings of the companies, which are available
through LEXIS NEXIS.
Company issuing common
stock to finance research and
development programs
Gross (net)
proceeds of
offering in $
millions
Description and phase of R&D financed by the
SWORD structure
Adolor Corp 60 (59) ADL 8-2698 and peripheral opioid analsegic (phase 3)
Alexion Pharmaceuticals 10 (9.5) C5 complement inhibitor and several other products(phases 2 and 3)
Amarin Corp Plc 12.775 (12) Miraxion™ (phase 3)
Amylin Pharmaceuticals Inc 35 (33.8) AC2993, AC2993 LAR, SYMLIN™ (phase 3)
Biocryst Pharmaceuticals 2 Several programs (all phases)
Biocryst Pharmaceuticals 8 Several programs (all phases)
Bionutrics 1 Several programs (all phases)
Bionutrics 0.5 Several programs (all phases)
Cel-Sci Corp 5.25 (4.8) Multikine® (phase 3)
Cell Technology Inc 8.9 ImuVert™, Vasoprin™, Aviron™, Pyrexol™,Leukosol™, (phases 2 and 3)
Cellegy Pharmaceuticals Inc 15.4 (15.1) Anogesic®, Tostrex™, Tostrelle™ (phase 3)
Cellegy Pharmaceuticals Inc 11.625 (11.6) Anogesic®, Tostrex™, Tostrelle™ (phase 3)
Cerus Corp 25 (23.5) Several programs (phase 3)
Cubist Pharmaceuticals Inc 18.8 (17.5) Daptomycin, VITA™ (phases 2 and 3)
Cubist Pharmaceuticals Inc 55 (53.2) Daptomycin, VITA™ (phases 2 and 3)
Depomed Inc 8.8 (8.1) Metformin GR™, Ciproflaxacin gr™ (phase 3)
KVH Industries Inc 10 Photonic Fiber and Mobile Broadband (phase 3)
KVH Industries Inc 4 Photonic Fiber and Mobile Broadband (phase 3)
Lecroy Corp 25 (23.2) Several products
Liposome Technology 36.8 TLC G-65, TLC C-53 (phase 3)
Nastech Pharmaceutical Inc 5.8 (5) Intranasal Apomorphine and several other products(phases 2 and 3)
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Neo Rx Corp 37 (36) Pretarget®, STR (phase 3)
Neurogen Corp 46 (43) Several products (all phases)
Neurogen Corp 41 (38.7) Use of AIDD™ technology for new drug discovery
Onyx Pharmaceuticals Inc 10 (9.9) BAY-439006 (phase 3)
Oxigene Inc 24.2 (22.4) Combretastatin A4 Prodrug (CA4P) (phase 2)
Penwest Ltd 30 Several products (phases 1 and 2)
Pharmos Corp 7.3 Dexanabinol (phase 3)
Sano Corp 16.2 (15) Several products (all phases)
Sonus Pharmaceuticals Inc 15.2 (14.4) TOCOSOL™ Paclitaxel and other oncology products(phases 2 and 3)
Targeted Genetics Corp 30.3 (28.1) tgDCC-E1A and other products (phases 2 and 3)
Valentis Inc 19.2 (18.8) Several products (phases 2 and 3)
Vion Pharmaceuticals Inc 0.75 Several products
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Table 11
Chronological distribution and the method of issuance of the offering /placement of common
stock sample to finance R&D programs
Of the 33 common stock offerings/placements to finance research and development programs 3 were
public offerings (i.e., the common shares and the warrants were registered with SEC and listed on a U.S.
stock exchange) and 30 were private placements.
Announcement
year
Private
placements
Public
issues Total
Percent of
sample
1989 1 1 3.03
1992 1 1 3.03
1994 1 1 3.03
1995 1 1 3.03
1996 1 1 3.03
1997 1 1 3.03
1998 1 1 3.03
1999 3 3 9.09
2000 8 8 24.24
2001 9 9 27.27
2002 1 1 3.03
2003 1 1 3.03
2004 3 1 4 12.12
Total 30 3 33 100.00
Percent of sample 90.91 9.09 100
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Table 12
Industry classification of the common stock offerings/placements sample to finance R&D
programs by the 1987 SIC code
Four-
digit
SIC code
Industry Privateplacements
Public
issues Total Percent
2834 Pharmaceutical preparations 17 1 18 54.55
2835 In vitro and in vivo diagnostic substances 2 2 6.06
2836 Biological products, except diagnostic substances 8 2 10 30.30
3812 Search, Detection, Navigation, Guidance,Aeronautical & Nautical 2 2 6.06
3825 Instruments for Measuring & Testing ofElectricity & Electrical Signals 1 1 3.03
Total 30 3 33 100.00
Percent of sample 90.91 9.09 100
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Table 13
Descriptive statistics and comparisons of the gross proceeds raised through the SWORD structure, stock and warrant or stock only offerings
to finance R&D
The amounts of gross proceeds raised through the SWORD structures, stock and warrant offerings or stock only offerings to finance R&D are
adjusted to reflect 2000 values and then tested to detect differences in the amounts raised through the different financing methods. The same
descriptive statistics are repeated for the ratios of gross proceeds (unadjusted) to the market value of the company on the last trading day of the month
prior to the announcement month. The CPI index was obtained from the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minnesota. The hypotheses tested
are (i) the means of the various financing methods are equal and (ii) the two financing methods have identical distribution functions against the
alternative hypothesis that the two distribution functions differ only with respect to location (median). The reported test statistics are the parametric t-
value for differences in the means and the Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney values for differences in the medians.
Mean Median Max Min N
Financing methods Adjusted
(2000) gross
proceeds
Gross
proceeds to
market value
(%)
Adjusted
(2000) gross
proceeds
Gross
proceeds to
market
value (%)
Adjusted
(2000) gross
proceeds
Gross
proceeds to
market
value (%)
Adjusted
(2000) gross
proceeds
Gross
proceeds to
market value
(%)
SWORD 55.03 55.76 51.87 17.82 129.67 741.07 1.06 0.20 59
Stock and warrant 10.44 52.34 9.03 13.72 44.92 946.51 0.57 3.28 38
Stock 19.64 14.43 13.86 10.28 58.37 84.39 0.49 0.94 33
Tests for differences in means Tests for differences in mediansComparisons of financing
methods Adjusted (2000) gross
proceeds
Gross proceeds to market
value (%)
Adjusted (2000) gross
proceeds
Gross proceeds to market
value (%)
SWORD, stock and warrant
offerings
[55.03; 10.44]a
(7.68)
[55.76; 52.34]
(0.12)
[51.87; 9.03]a
(6.39)
[17.82; 13.72]
(0.33)
SWORD, stock offerings [55.03; 19.64]
a
(5.48)
[55.76; 14.43]
(1.97)
[51.87; 13.86]a
(4.90)
[17.82; 10.28]
(0.95)
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Stock and warrant, stock offerings [10.44; 19.64]
a
(2.97)
[52.34; 14.43]
(1.38)
[9.03; 13.86]b
(2.45)
[13.72; 10.28]
(1.87)
The symbols a, b, c denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels of statistical significance.
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Table 14a
Short-term event study for the SWORD formation announcements
A short term event study for 41companies that formed 66 SWORD entities during the period 1980-1998
was conducted to evaluate the market perception of the research company’s choice to use the SWORD
entity to finance part of its R&D program. The 66 SWORD formations were accomplished through 46
private placements and 20 public issues. Another sample of companies that issued stock and warrants to
finance their R&D program in the period 1980-1998 was also collected. The market model
it mt itR a R    is used to estimate the abnormal returns, it . The equally weighted CRSP index is
the market. The reported test statistics (inside parenthesis) are the t and the Wilcoxon t-statistic. The null
hypothesis tested is that the cumulative abnormal returns between periods 1 and 2 is equal to 0
1 2
( 0)T TCAAR  . The same event study is conducted for 3 additional samples. The first sample consists
of announcements of prior stock issuance by the companies that later formed a SWORD structure (no
later than 2 years). The second sample consists of companies which announced they are issuing /placing
stock and warrants to finance R&D. The third sample consists of companies which announced they are
issuing/placing stock to finance only or mainly R&D. The data for the 3 samples was obtained from the
SDC Platinum database (first sample), the Factiva-Dow Jones News and the LEXIS NEXIS Newswires
databases over the period 1978 through 2004.
Panel A . Market reaction to the SWORD formation announcement
Full sample
(n = 66)
Privately placed
(n = 46)
Publicly issued
(n = 20)
Period
relative to
announc. in
DJN 1 2T T
CAAR Percentage
positive 1 2T T
CAAR Percentage
positive 1 2T T
CAAR Percentage
positive
[-30; -1] 1.29(0.41)
48.5
(0.35)
2.52
(0.61)
45.7
(0.43)
-1.53
(-0.36)
55.0
(0.00)
[-10; -1] 1.71(1.16)
56.1
(1.39)
2.19
(1.20)
52.2
(1.19)
0.75
(0.27)
65.0
(0.75)
[-5; +5] 3.19
c
(2.04)
62.1b
(2.21)
3.01
(1.54)
58.7
(1.39)
3.60
(1.38)
70.0c
(1.72)
[-5; -1] 2.12(1.74)
54.5
(1.26)
2.31
(1.43)
52.2
(0.79)
1.68
(1.06)
60.0
(0.97)
[-1; 0] 1.01(1.64)
56.1
(1.10)
0.79
(1.02)
52.2
(0.51)
1.51
(1.52)
65.0
(1.27)
[0; 0] 0.71(1.48)
47.0
(0.71)
0.22
(0.39)
43.5
(0.19)
1.83
(2.06)
55.0
(1.57)
[0; +1] 0.34(0.45)
45.5
(0.11)
-0.23
(-0.26)
43.5
(0.92)
1.67
(1.13)
50.0
(1.01)
[0; +5] 1.07(0.96)
53.0
(1.03)
0.70
(0.52)
47.8
(0.33)
1.93
(0.95)
65.0
(1.34)
[+2; +30] 0.75(0.30)
51.5
(0.78)
-0.10
(-0.03)
50.0
(0.22)
2.72
(0.57)
55.0
(0.97)
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Panel B. Market reaction to the announcements of stock offerings by companies that formed later
SWORD structures, stock and warrant offerings to finance R&D and stock only offerings to finance
R&D
Prior stock issues of the
SWORD sample
(n = 19, public = 19)
Stock and warrants for R&D
sample
(n = 38, private = 36)
Stock for R&D sample
(n = 33, private =30)
Period
relative to
announc. in
DJN 1 2T TCAAR
Percentage
positive 1 2T T
CAAR Percentage
positive 1 2T T
CAAR Percentage
positive
[-30; -1] 0.97(0.22)
47.4
0.12)
11.67
(1.27)
52.63
(0.45)
-3.32
(-0.46)
33.33
(1.18)
[-10; -1] -4.00(-1.55)
31.6
(1.41)
5.50
(1.30)
57.89
(0.59)
-1.85
(-0.47)
42.42
(1.00)
[-5; +5] -2.82(-0.94)
31.6
(1.05)
8.84
(1.55)
52.63
(1.06)
3.03
(0.89)
60.61
(0.71)
[-5; -1] 0.93(0.52)
47.4
(0.08)
4.87
(1.42)
47.4
(0.51)
-0.56
(-0.30)
42.42
(0.43)
[-1; 0] 0.16(0.15)
31.6
(0.68)
0.66
(0.35)
50.0
(0.33)
1.55
(0.98)
51.52
(0.43)
[0; 0] -2.47
a
(-3.32)
15.80a
(2.70)
-1.76
(-1.42)
39.47
(1.47)
3.76
(1.84)
63.64
(1.94)
[0; +1] -3.33
a
(-3.39)
21.1a
(2.70)
0.33
(0.16)
47.37
(0.29)
3.04
(1.40)
57.58
(0.86)
[0; +5] -3.75(-1.67)
42.1
(1.21)
3.97
(0.90)
50.00
(0.76)
3.59
(1.24)
54.55
(0.54)
[+2; +30] -13.03
b
(-2.93)
21.1b
(2.58)
-0.59
(-0.13)
57.89
(0.07)
-2.39
(-0.39)
36.36
(0.82)
The symbols a, b, c are used to denote statistical significance at .01, .05 and .1 respectively.
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Table 14.b
Short-term event study for the final decision announcements
A short term event study for 37 final decision announcements to evaluate the market reaction to the
acquisition or termination announcements. The sample consists of 31 pure acquisition announcements
(no tender offers) and 6 termination announcements. The market model it mt itR a R    is used to
estimate the abnormal returns, it . The equally weighted CRSP index is the market. The reported test
statistics (inside parenthesis) are the t and the Wilcoxon t-statistic. The null hypothesis tested is that the
cumulative abnormal returns between periods 1 and 2 is equal to 0
Acquisition announcements
(n = 31)
Termination announcements
(n = 6)Period relative to
announc. in DJN
1 2T T
CAAR Percentage
positive 1 2T T
CAAR Percentage
positive
[-30; -1] 2.57(0.58)
61.3
(1.33)
-3.33
(-0.42)
33.3
(0.42)
[-5; -0] 0.77(0.43)
58.1
(1.12)
-3.01
(-0.75)
33.3
(0.84)
[-1; 0] 1.12(1.39)
48.4
(0.74)
1.61
(1.01)
83.3
(1.05)
[0; 0] 1.05(1.70)
48.4
(1.49)
0.70
(0.40)
0.5
(0.00)
[0; +1] 0.74(0.67)
45.2
(0.29)
5.98a
(4.25)
100.0c
(2.10)
[+2; +10] -2.38(-1.09)
48.4
(1.41)
15.46
(1.89)
100c
(2.10)
[+2; +30] -0.88(-0.26)
51.6
(0.25)
20.03
(1.41)
83.3
(1.68)
The symbols a, b, c are used to denote statistical significance at .01, .05 and .1 respectively.
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Table 15
Pre and post-announcement average abnormal buy and hold stock returns
The abnormal return for each event firm is calculated as: , , , ,( 1) - ( 1)
b b
i a b i t m t
t a t a
ER R R
 
    where ER(i,a,b) = Excess return for firm i over the
time period from day a to day b, itR = the return on the common share of event firm i on day t, and Rmt is either the return on a reference portfolio
(the CRSP equally-weighted index and the CRSP value weighted index) or a matched firm on day t. The match occurs in year 0, the year of the
announcement. Matched firms are selected using the following matching criteria: (1) R&D intensity measures as R&D to sales in year -1, (2) return
on assets (ROA) in year 0, the year of the announcement; (3) size and 3-digit industry SIC code at the end of the previous month relative to the
announcement calendar month; and (4) size and the ratio of book to market value at the end of the previous month relative to the announcement
calendar month. The pre and post-announcement abnormal returns do not include the abnormal returns over days 0 through 1 relative to the Wall
Street Journal announcement date. If an event firm is de-listed before the end of a buy-and-hold period, its truncated return series is still included in
the analysis, and it is assumed to earn the daily return of the benchmark for the remainder of the period. The statistical significance of each of the
average abnormal returns is tested using the parametric t-test which is reported under the average abnormal return and the non- parametric Wilcoxon
signed rank test which is reported under % of negative abnormal returns. The null hypothesis tested is that the mean and median average monthly
abnormal returns are equal to zero. In the case of multiple SWORD announcements with less than 3-year difference between consecutive
announcements both announcements are dropped.
Pre-announcement buy-and-hold
period
Post-announcement buy-and-hold
periodReferencebenchmark
Number of observa-
tions
(N)
Statistic
-3 years -2 years -1 years +1 years +2 years +3 years
Average abnormal return 89.06
a
(3.06)
117.61b
(2.35)
69.76
(1.57)
7.43
(0.48)
-1.07
(-0.05)
-20.77
(-1.21)CRSP value
weighted index 34 % of negative abnormal returns 23.5
a
(3.19)
29.4b
(2.38)
44.1
(1.03)
61.8
(1.15)
70.6
(1.92)
55.9
(1.44)
Average abnormal return 52.14(1.73)
94.00
(1.88)
54.89
(1.25)
-5.52
(-0.36)
-27.86
(-1.25)
-65.53b
(-2.78)CRSP equally
weighted index 34
% of negative abnormal returns 35.3(1.19)
41.2
(1.43)
58.8
(0.04)
70.6c
(1.72)
73.5b
(2.13)
61.8b
(2.37)
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Average abnormal return 95.18
b
(2.76)
148.63c
(2.33)
87.05
(1.42)
67.88b
(2.95)
72.88c
(2.25)
56.11b
(2.88)3-digit SIC and
R&D/sales 24 % of negative abnormal returns 20.8
a
(2.83)
16.7a
(3.11)
29.2b
(2.00)
20.8a
(3.34)
29.2
(2.43)
29.2
(2.46)
Average abnormal return 6.31(0.09)
51.80
(1.35)
-8.41
(-0.31)
21.65
(1.21)
6.04
(0.23)
-25.23
(-0.60)3-digit SIC and
R&D/market value 30 % of negative abnormal returns 36.7(1.49)
36.7
(1.51)
43.3
(0.57)
43.3
(0.89)
50.0
(0.50)
53.3
(0.13)
Average abnormal return 92.02
b
(2.81)
99.44c
(2.06)
33.06
(0.89)
2.15
(0.14)
15.62
(0.78)
8.38
(0.30)4-digit SIC, ROA
and size 32 % of negative abnormal returns 32.4
a
(2.83)
32.4b
(2.06)
44.1
(1.87)
52.9
(0.32)
52.9
(0.01)
44.1
(0.95)
Average abnormal return 69.35
b
(2.66)
106.08b
(2.44)
61.92
(1.41)
9.88
(0.53)
28.20
(1.33)
4.69
(0.24)3-digit SIC and size 34
% of negative abnormal returns 29.4
a
(3.05)
35.3b
(2.37
44.1
(1.07)
47.1
(0.15)
50.0
(0.42)
47.1
(0.13)
Average abnormal return 26.12(0.49)
26.95
(0.57)
17.47
(0.78)
-6.15
(-0.24)
9.440
(0.22)
7.886
(0.24)Size and book-to-
market ratio 24 % of negative abnormal returns 50.0(0.11)
45.8
(0.06)
58.3
(0.49)
45.8
(0.26)
45.8
(0.17)
41.7
(0.51)
Average abnormal return 13.23(0.22)
17.13
(0.29)
-132.30
(-0.82)
17.53
(1.09)
11.93
(0.41)
18.18
(0.63)Book-to-market 31
% of negative abnormal returns 45.2(1.14)
41.9
(1.12)
38.7
(0.98)
51.6
(0.63)
54.8
(0.00)
45.2
(0.59)
The symbols a, b, c are used to denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels of statistical significance.
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Table 16
Pre and post SWORD formation announcement long term stock price performance
This table displays the pre and post-formation-announcement long-term abnormal stock returns of the sample firms using the Fama and French
(1993) and Carhart (1997) four-factor return model. To estimate the pre announcement one-, two, and three-year period abnormal monthly returns,
each month sample firms that formed a SWORD structure in the next 12, 24 or 36 months are identified and then equally and value-weighted
average monthly returns are calculated for these firms. To estimate the post announcement one, two, and three-year period abnormal monthly returns,
each month sample firms that formed a SWORD structure in the previous 12, 24 or 36 months are identified and then equally- and value-weighted
average monthly returns are calculated for these firms. The value-weighted returns are based on the market values of the firms in the rolling portfolio
as of the end of the month before the announcement date. The monthly event portfolio returns Rp,t are used in the following model of: Fama and
French (1993) and Carhart (1997):
p ,t f ,t i m m,t f ,t s t h t M tR R ( R R ) SMB HML MOM          
where Rf,t is the one-month U.S. Treasury bill rate in month t, Rm,t is the return on the value-weighted CRSP index in month t, SMBt is the difference
between the returns on portfolios of small and big stocks with about the same weighted average book-to-market value of equity ratio in month t,
HMLt is the difference between the returns on portfolios of high and low book-to-market value of equity ratio with about the same weighted average
size in month t, MOM is the average return on the two high prior return portfolios minus the average return on the two low prior return portfolios and
 , m , s , h and M, are either ordinary- or weighted-least-squares estimates (OLS or WLS). The WLS model weights each calendar month
portfolio return with the square root of the number of firms for that month. The intercept  is considered the average abnormal monthly return of the
event-portfolio across all 12, 24 or 36 months. The probability values shown in brackets pertain to two-tailed t-tests.
Pre and Post
formation
periods
(No of obs.)
Event
portfolio
return

Parameters’
estimation
method

[p-value]
m
[p-value]
s
[p-value]
h
[p-value]
M
[p-value] R
2 (%) AdjustedR2 (%)
OLS 1.92
a
[0.00]
1.34a
[0.00]
0.88a
[0.00]
-0.41
[0.15]
0.03
[0.89] 38.52 37.44Equally-
weighted
WLS 2.60
a
[0.00]
1.24a
[0.00]
1.06a
[0.00]
-0.60b
[0.02]
0.09
[0.63] 45.60 44.65
Three
years pre
(234)
Value-
weighted OLS 0.86[0.14]
1.33a
[0.00]
0.53b
[0.02]
-0.49
[0.05]
-0.25b
[0.02] 40.22 39.18
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Table 16 (continued)
WLS 1.31
b
[0.02]
1.25a
[0.00]
0.53b
[0.01]
-0.64b
[0.01]
-0.13
[0.40] 47.08 46.16
OLS 3.12
a
[0.00]
1.27a
[0.00]
0.90b
[0.01]
-0.81b
[0.02]
0.22
[0.37] 33.06 31.82Equally-
weighted
WLS 3.27
a
[0.00]
1.17a
[0.00]
1.16a
[0.00]
-0.74b
[0.02]
0.19
[0.38] 41.09 40.01
OLS 2.13
b
[0.01]
1.34a
[0.00]
0.77b
[0.01]
-0.70c
[0.04]
-0.21
[0.37] 32.76 31.52
Two
years pre
(222)
Value-
weighted
WLS 1.91
b
[0.01]
1.22a
[0.00]
0.71b
[0.01]
-0.68b
[0.02]
-0.04
[0.85] 40.41 39.31
OLS 3.38
a
[0.00]
1.28a
[0.00]
0.81c
[0.04]
-0.99b
[0.01]
0.03
[0.92] 30.86 29.34Equally-
weighted
WLS 3.12
a
[0.00]
1.25a
[0.00]
1.21a
[0.00]
-0.79b
[0.02]
-0.18
[0.49] 38.58 37.23
OLS 2.48[0.98]
1.26
[0.23]
0.54
[0.38]
-0.92
[0.40]
0.18
[0.28] 29.52 27.97
One
year pre
(187)
Value-
weighted
WLS 1.55[0.08]
1.26a
[0.00]
0.66c
[0.04]
-0.59
[0.10]
0.12
[0.64] 33.36 31.89
OLS 0.46[0.64]
1.16a
[0.00]
1.94a
[0.00]
-0.49
[0.24]
-0.47
[0.13] 31.38 29.83Equally-
weighted
WLS 0.56[0.52]
1.16a
[0.00]
1.77a
[0.00]
-0.56
[0.10]
-0.50
[0.07] 35.98 34.54
OLS 0.22[0.81]
1.12a
[0.00]
1.50a
[0.00]
-0.62
[0.12]
-0.53
[0.07] 29.72 28.13
One
year post
(182)
Value-
weighted
WLS 0.22[0.78]
1.13a
[0.00]
1.03a
[0.00]
-0.69c
[0.03]
-0.48
[0.06] 33.48 31.98
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OLS 0.23[0.81]
1.09a
[0.00]
1.11a
[0.00]
-0.74
0.06]
-0.32
[0.27] 24.37 22.98Equally-
weighted
WLS 0.22[0.74]
1.23a
[0.00]
1.32a
[0.00]
-0.59c
[0.03]
-0.40
[0.06] 40.35 39.25
OLS -0.05[0.96]
1.07a
[0.00]
0.64
[0.07]
-0.68
[0.09]
-0.17
[0.55] 20.29 18.82
Two
years post
(222)
Value-
weighted
WLS 0.12[0.85]
1.12a
[0.00]
0.44
[0.10]
-0.67b
[0.01]
-0.12
[0.56] 32.73 31.49
OLS 0.03[0.96]
1.26a
[0.00]
0.51c
[0.04]
-0.05
[0.88]
-0.16
[0.45] 24.10 22.78Equally-
weighted
WLS 0.22[0.71]
1.20
[0.00]
1.01a
[0.00]
-0.53c
[0.03]
-0.37c
[0.05] 39.77 38.72
OLS 0.55[0.47]
1.25
[0.00]
0.09
[0.71]
0.11
[0.73]
0.03
[0.87] 20.28 18.88
Three
years post
(234)
Value-
weighted
WLS 0.66[0.25]
1.13
[0.00]
0.00
[0.99]
-0.43
[0.07]
-0.09
[0.62] 29.58 28.35
The symbols a, b and c are used to denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels of statistical significance
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Table 17.a
The impact of a SWORD entity on the parent company’s consolidated income statement during the years it pays revenues to the parent
company
The impact of the SWORD entity on the parent company’s consolidated income statement is measured under the assumption the parent company
raises the gross proceeds it raised through the SWORD offering through its own equity issuance during the announcement month. All data for the
SWORD gross proceeds, contributions, payments and costs of acquisitions, the parent company revenues, R&D expenses, net income, and weighted
number of shares outstanding were obtained from the SEC filings (ARS) of the parent company. The adjusted net income is calculated as net income
+ total cost of acquisition or the cash part of the acquisition in the case of royalty payments (there will be a cash payment typically at the time of
acquisition and future royalties depending on net sales). The number of shares needed to raise the gross proceeds is calculated as gross proceeds
divided by the average price of the parent stock in the announcement month. Every year there is a split, the number of shares needed to raise the
gross proceeds is adjusted accordingly to reflect the split. The earnings per share are calculated as net income divided by weighted number of
outstanding shares. To calculate the adjusted earnings per share, the SWORD contribution now is is subtracted from the net income. The adjusted
earnings per share are calculated by dividing the adjusted net income by the sum of the weighted number of outstanding shares and the number of
shares needed to raise the gross proceeds. The percentage change (  ) in earnings per share is calculated as
100 ( adjusted earnings per share earnings per share )EPS *
earnings per share

  . Companies which report better adjusted earnings are companies that would have
shown better EPS if they had raised the gross proceeds through issuance of their own equity. The opposite is true for companies with worst adjusted
EPS.
Year 0 Year +1
Variables
mean median max min N mean median max min N
SWORD contribution /revenues (%) 14.57 7.51 77.16 0.17 47 20.64 14.12 68.08 0.17 51
SWORD contribution /R&D (%) 29.00 18.00 155.25 1.08 40 46.63 33.25 164.55 1.19 48
SWORD contribution /adjusted net income (%) 140.62 33.77 1823.15 0.57 47 230.13 56.87 2141.15 1.00 52
Number of shares needed to raise gross proceeds / weighted
number of outstanding shares (%) 14.78 14.56 48.03 1.37 48 12.65 11.16 39.33 1.37 46
126
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Earnings per share -0.14 -0.12 9.91 -5.72 51 -0.13 0.18 4.30 -5.10 52
Adjusted earnings per share -0.26 -0.33 8.01 -3.47 44 -0.56 -0.42 4.20 -5.25 44
Δ in earnings per share (%)
291.26
(0.70)
-18.99a
(3.09) 18086.94 -1698.91 44
-209.71a
(-3.01)
-57.13a
(4.99) 64.32 -1831.16 44
Number of companies with better / worse adj. earnings per share 14 / 30 44 6 / 38 44
Year +2 Year +3
Variables
mean median max min N mean median max min N
SWORD contribution /revenues (%) 17.48 11.47 76.30 0.31 43 12.61 9.05 70.36 0.30 29
SWORD contribution /R&D (%) 41.99 32.51 123.86 0.72 40 25.40 18.84 109.83 1.12 28
SWORD contribution /adjusted net income (%) 141.29 52.07 1963.44 3.52 44 99.96 18.83 1687.73 1.11 28
Number of shares needed to raise gross proceeds / weighted
number of outstanding shares (%) 11.09 9.31 29.02 1.45 40 11.10 11.12 26.69 2.04 28
Earnings per share -0.02 0.05 9.91 -3.42 44 -0.36 -0.35 9.91 -5.21 28
Adjusted earnings per share -0.50 -0.67 7.31 -3.22 39 -0.26 -0.41 7.66 -5.20 28
Δ in earnings per share (%)
-
132.11b
(-2.79)
-36.96a
(5.28) 7.29 -1677.25 39
-65.99
(-1.24)
-8.75
(1.65) 131.90 -1466.26 28
Number of companies with better / worse adj. earnings per share 2 / 37 39 10 / 18 28
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Year +4 Year + 5
mean median max min N mean median max min N
SWORD contribution /revenues (%) 8.80 7.82 24.80 0.34 11 2.50 2.19 5.27 0.06 6
SWORD contribution /R&D (%) 22.92 16.41 105.20 1.56 11 6.15 2.81 15.08 1.18 6
SWORD contribution /adjusted net income (%) 95.35 26.42 806.51 0.79 11 11.72 2.09 38.62 0.68 6
Number of shares needed to raise gross proceeds / weighted
number of outstanding shares (%) 11.88 10.84 22.88 3.91 10 9.58 10.27 17.04 4.02 6
Earnings per share 0.61 -0.28 9.91 -5.10 10 -0.85 0.24 4.01 -5.72 6
Adjusted earnings per share 0.41 -0.33 8.37 -4.80 10 -0.46 0.15 3.83 -4.91 6
Δ in earnings per share (%)
-18.39
(-2.00)
-11.38
(1.43) 16.85 -56.53 10
-2.93
(-0.26)
-8.09
(0.63) 46.69 -33.15 6
Number of companies with better / worse adj. earnings per share 4 / 6 10 2 / 4 6
The symbols a, b and c are used to denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels of statistical significance
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Table 17.b
Cumulative impact of the SWORD entities on the parent company’s consolidated income statement during the years they pay revenues to
the parent company
The impact of single or multiple SWORDs contributing during the same year to a parent company is measured. The procedures are the same as in
Table 17a. In the single SWORD case the same procedure as in Table 17a is followed for each year that it contributes. In the case of multiple
SWORDs the payments of all SWORD payments are summed into a single payment. The number of shares needed to raise gross proceeds is the sum
of shares needed to raise the gross process for all SWORDs making payments in that year (adjusted for splits)
mean median max min N
SWORD contribution /revenues (%) 19.44 13.02 77.16 0.06 158
SWORD contribution /R&D (%) 42.75 32.92 164.55 0.72 146
SWORD contribution /adjusted net income (%) 188.80 53.09 3510.89 0.43 160
Number of shares needed to raise gross proceeds / weighted number of outstanding
shares (%) 18.32 16.60 67.26 1.37 147
Earnings per share -0.19 0.04 9.91 -5.72 158
Adjusted earnings per share -0.43 -0.47 4.43 -4.91 146
Δ in earnings per share (%)
-41.08
(-0.35)
-39.18a
(7.14) 16119.66 -2851.15 146
Number of companies with better / worse adj. earnings per share 33 / 113 146
The symbols a, b and c are used to denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels of statistical significance
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Table 18.a
Descriptive statistics and comparison of the information asymmetries proxies between the SWORD companies and their matching samples
Descriptive statistics for the information asymmetry variables in the year prior to the announcement year for the SWORD sample companies and two
matching samples. The matching criteria were (i) the 3-digit Compustat SIC code and the ratio of R&D/sales in year -1and (ii) the market-to-book
ratio in year -1. In panel B descriptive statistics and comparisons are provided for the SWORD sample and a sample of companies which issued stock
and warrants to finance mainly R&D and another sample stock only offering to finance R&D. All the data were obtained from the CRSP and I/B/E/S
databases and are from year -1 relative to the announcement year. The 3 reported variables are the same as in Krishnaswami and Subramanian (JFE,
1999). The forecast error is the absolute value of the difference of the actual earnings per share and the mean forecast estimate in the last month of
the forecasting period divided by the stock price in the beginning of the month. The standard deviation of forecasts is the standard deviation of
analyst’s forecasts in the last month of the forecasting period. The residual standard deviation is the residual volatility of the market adjusted returns
of the market model. The market is the CRSP equal weight index. The reported test statistics in panel A for the differences are the pair wise
comparisons of the means (t- value) and the Wilcoxon signed rank test for the medians. The null hypotheses tested are i) the mean value is 0 and ii)
the median value is 0. In panel B the tests for the differences are the t- value for differences in the means and the Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test for
differences in the medians of different size samples.
Panel A. Level of information asymmetries in the year prior to the announcement for the sample SWORD companies, the R&D intensity matching
companies and the market-to-book ratio matching companies
SWORD companies R&D to sales matchingsample Difference
Market-to-book matching
sample DifferenceVariables
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N
Forecast error 0.00879 0.00077 46 0.01951 0.00710 16 -0.01303
b
(-3.27)
-0.00934a
-3.02 12 0.00884 0.00003 40
0.00921
(1.625)
0.00126b
(2.51) 30
Std. deviation
of forecasts 0.07951 0.01000 41 0.04000 0.04000 12
-0.04855a
(-4.15)
-0.05494b
(-2.45) 8 0.04576 0.02000 33
0.07435
(1.46)
-0.01000
(0.46) 23
Residual std.
dev 0.03298 0.03115 60 0.04538 0.04575 40
-0.01433a
(-3.93)
-0.01110a
(-3.51) 36 0.03314 0.02650 57
0.00042
(0.10)
0.00480
(1.83) 55
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Panel B. Descriptive statistics and tests for differences in the means (t-values) and the medians (Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney) of the information
asymmetry proxies between the SWORD sample and the samples of companies which issued stock and warrants or stock only to finance R&D
SWORD sample Stock and warrant for R&Dsample
Tests for
differences Stock for R&D sample
Tests for
differencesVariables
Mean Median N Mean Median N Means Medians Mean Median N Means Medians
Forecast error 0.00879 0.00077 46 2.80092 0.01623 14 0.979 0.410 0.37320 0.00000 22 1.310 2.117
Std. deviation
of forecasts 0.07951 0.01000 41 0.11600 0.15000 5 0.417 1.659 0.07000 0.03500 12 0.164 0.914
Residual std.
dev 0.03298 0.03115 60 0.07440 0.06570 36 9.211
a 7.734a 0.06911 0.05560 32 4.920a 6.735a
The symbols a, b, c are used to denote statistical significance at .01, .05 and .1 respectively.
131
Table 18.b
Level of information asymmetries in the year prior to and in the year after the announcement for the sample companies
Descriptive statistics and tests for the differences of the information proxies in the years prior and after the announcement year. The reported test
statistics in panel A for the differences are the pair wise comparisons of the means (t- value) and the Wilcoxon signed rank test for the median. The
null hypotheses tested are i) the mean value is 0 and ii) the median value is 0.
The symbols a, b, c are used to denote statistical significance at .01, .05 and .1 respectively.
Before the announcement After the announcement Difference
Variables
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N
Forecast error 0.008787 0.000772 46 0.014304 0.001591 52 -0.005597(-1.23)
-0.000167
(1.49) 46
Std. deviation of
forecasts 0.079512 0.010000 41 0.127400 0.030000 50
-0.065122b
(-2.66)
-0.010000b
(2.37) 41
Residual std. dev 0.032980 0.031150 60 0.034244 0.031650 66 -0.000763(-0.53)
-0.002100
(0.71) 60
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Table 19
Changes in post-event risk
Following the methodology of Boehme and Sorescu (2002) we estimate changes in equity risk loadings
following the Fama-French (1993) and Carhart (1997) four factor model:
i ,t f ,t i t i i m,t f ,t i t i t i t
i t m,t f ,t i t t i t t i t t
R R D ( R R ) SMB h HML m MOM
D ( R R ) D SMB h D HML m D MOM
   
 

   
       
    
A regression is performed separately for each company and for the months -36 to +36 relative to the
announcement (month 0, the announcement month is not included in the regression). tD is a dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 if the data is from the post-event period and 0 otherwise. The
regression coefficients i i i i, ,h ,m     according to Boehme and Sorescu (2002) then represent changes
in the loadings of the four factor Fama-French (1993) and Carhart (1997) model. i ,t f ,tR R is the excess
return the company earns when compared to the one month treasury bill, the explanatory variables are
(1)Rm-Rf, the excess return on the market, the value-weight return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ
stocks (from CRSP) minus the one-month Treasury bill rate, (2) SMB (Small Minus Big) is the average
return on the three small portfolios minus the average return on the three big portfolios (3) HML (High
Minus Low) is the average return on the two value portfolios minus the average return on the two
growth portfolios (4) MOM is the average return on the two high prior return portfolios minus the
average return on the two low prior return portfolios. The hypotheses tested are (1) the mean and median
of the regression coefficients are equal to 0 and (2) the mean and median changes in the four factor
loadings are equal to 0. The reported test statistics for the two-tailed tests are the parametric t-statistic
and the non-parametric Wilcoxon sign rank. The sample consists of 34 announcements made by
companies that had at least 36 month between consecutive announcements.
The symbols a, b and c are used to denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels of statistical
significance
Cross-sectional mean and median values of the
risk change regression coefficients
Mean value of
coefficients
[t-value]
Median value of
coefficients
[Wilcoxon signed rank]
Pre-event regression coefficients
i
0.61
[0.61]
1.40a
[3.32]
i
2.55c
[2.06]
0.96a
[3.23]
ih
-1.32
[-1.91]
-0.88b
[2.62]
im
-1.09
[-1.13]
-0.10
[0.74]
Post event change in coefficients
i
0.73
[0.79]
-0.00
[0.14]
i
-1.00
[-0.77]
-0.02
[0.07]
ih
-0.09
[-0.10]
0.40
[0.48]
im
0.50
[0.51]
-0.01
[0.43]
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Table 20
Delisting codes, reasons and number of delisted companies for the SWORD sample and its R&D matching sample for 5 years after the year
of a SWORD formation
Following the methodology of Schultz (1993) a company is characterized as a non-survivor if it has a delisting code in the 500s (excluding codes
501-520) in the 5 years following the SWORD announcement year. The logistic regression
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3
5
1
SWORD ln( SLS ) ln( AGE )
i SWORD ln( SLS ) ln( AGE )
e
e
   
   

  
  


is used to estimate the
effect of forming a SWORD entity on the probability of the company surviving the next 5 years. The sample is comprised of 36 companies which
formed SWORD entities for the first time and their 36 matching companies. The dependent variable is SURV which take the value 1 if the company
survives in the next 5 years and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are SWORD, which equals 1 if the company formed a SWORD structure and
0 otherwise, the logarithm of sales (SLS, expressed in millions) and the logarithm of age (AGE, expressed in months). The hypothesis tested in panel
B is the coefficient i of the logistic regression is zero. Reported test statistics in panel B are the z-values ( ) and the marginal effects at the mean of
each independent variable [ ] expressed in % .
Panel A. Delisting codes, reasons for delisting and descriptive data of the delistings for the SWORD and its R&D intensity matching sample
CRSP
delisting
code
CRSP explanation for delisting SWORDsample
R&D
matching
sample
500 Issue stopped trading on exchange - reason unavailable 3
550 Delisted by current exchange - insufficient number of market makers 1
560 Delisted by current exchange - insufficient capital, surplus, and/or equity. 1 3
561 Delisted by current exchange - insufficient (or non-compliance with rules of) float or assets 3
574 Delisted by current exchange - bankruptcy, declared insolvent. 1
580 Delisted by current exchange - delinquent in filing, non-payment of fees 1 2
584 Delisted by current exchange - does not meet exchange's financial guidelines for continued listing 1
Total number of delisted companies 2 14
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Panel B. The probability that a company will survive 5 years after the SWORD formation is given by
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3
5
1
SWORD ln( SLS ) ln( AGE )
i SWORD ln( SLS ) ln( AGE )
e
e
   
   

  
  


(t-values) [marginal probabilities]
0 1 2 3 McFadden 2R N
0.55
(0.20)
2.52a
(2.26) [23.33]
0.15
(1.52) [1.35]
0.03
(0.24) [0.24] 22.93 72
The symbols a, b, c are used to denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels of statistical significance.
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Table 21
Descriptive warrant data and statistics
Description of the warrant component of the SWORD offerings. The data for the warrants was obtained
from the SEC filings (ARS and 10K) of the R&D company. They are the values the R&D company
reports in its consolidated financial statements. In panel A the increase in the number of shares is the
sum of the number of outstanding shares at the beginning of the announcement month and the number of
shares the warrants would convert, divided by the number of outstanding shares at the beginning of the
month minus 1. The duration from announcement to longest time to expiration is the number of months
from the announcement date to the latest date to exercise of the warrants. If there were only contingent
warrants exercisable upon the occurrence of certain future events these warrants were not included in the
sample. If there were more than one series of warrants, the warrants with the longest expiration date are
used to determine the duration. The duration from the final decision to longest time to expiration is the
time from the final decision announcement to the longest time to exercise. A negative value indicates
that the warrants expired prior to the final decision announcement (there were 4 such cases out of 37). In
panels B and C descriptive data for the status of the warrants around the final decision time and the
expiration time for the full sample, and sub-samples based on the type of the offering and the final
outcome are provided. The staged scheme of the warrants is followed from the announcement to
expiration. If there were stock splits during the examination period, the warrants were adjusted to reflect
the split and determine whether they were ‘in the money’. 15 warrant offerings were affected by stock
spits by the final decision time and the expiration time (out of 33 warrant offerings with available data).
The two examination periods are the seven months surrounding and including the final decision time
and the 3 months up to and including the expiration month. There are two test for the ‘moneyness’ of
warrants and they are used for both periods. The first test examines whether the price of the stock at any
point in the examination period exceeds the exercise price of the warrants at that time. To address the
fact that sometimes prices ‘spike’ and then drop a second stricter test is applied. A security is considered
to be in the money during the whole period if its minimum price during that period is above the exercise
price of the warrants.
Panel A. Descriptive statistics of the warrants
Warrant variables N Mean median max min
Percentage of gross proceeds 30 13.12 9.97 18.19 1.00
Increase in number of shares
(%) 43 15.91 12.91 45.14 2.48
Duration from
announcement to longest
time to expiration (in
40 71.99 64.03 123.88 22.42
Duration from final decision
to longest time to expiration
(in months)
37 23.44 25.55 77.85 -75.16*
Panel B. State of warrants at the acquisition or final decision time (months -3,-2, -1, 0, +1, +2, +3)
Type of (sub) sample N
Number of warrant offerings
which became in the money during
the examination period
Number of warrant offerings
in the money during the whole
period
33 23 17Full sample
(%) (70) (52)
16 10 9Public
(%) (63) (56)
17 13 8Private
(%) (76) (47)
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27 20 16Acquired
(%) (74) (59)
2 2 1Not acquired
(%) (100) (50)
Panel C. State of warrants at the expiration time (months -2, -1 and 0, the expiration month)
33 24 20Full sample
(%) (73) (61)
13 9 9Public
(%) (69) (69)
20 13 11Private
(%) (65) (55)
26 20 16Acquired
(%) (77) (62)
4 2 2Not acquired
(%) (50) (50)
3 2 2Not yet
(%) (67) (67)
*A negative number indicates that the final decision was reached after the warrants expired as in the case
of Vipont Pharmaceuticals Inc and Vipont Royalty Income Fund Ltd.
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